Micheline Labelle, François Rocher

“Immigration, integration and citizenship policies
in Canada and Quebec: tug of war between
competing societal projects.”

In Ricard Zapata-Barrero (ed.), Immigration and Self-Government of Minority nations, pp. 57-85. Bruxelles: Peter Lang, Collection Diversitas, vol. 3, 2009, 177 pp.

Introduction

International and domestic issues in taking account of diversity

Quebec immigration policy in the Canadian context

The comings and goings of “do-it-yourself” identity

Canadian identity on the offensive
Quebec citizenship in progress, or a citizen’s perspective

The return to communitarian management, or the temptations of communitarianism

Ethnocultural minorities and state management of diversity: divided loyalties

Conclusion

References

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to Quebec, there can be no question of referring to a single immigration policy or to a single policy for dealing with ethnocultural diversity. The Quebec government must develop its approach to immigration based on the constraints imposed by the federal framework. Furthermore, referring to immigration implies more than simply taking account of the number of newcomers the government is prepared to welcome or receiving them right away. Over the last decade, varied debates on immigration, Canadian-style multiculturalism, Quebec-style interculturalism, nation and citizenship have left their mark on Canada and Quebec. Each of these notions is the source of numerous academic interpretations and raises major political issues. Quebec, which presents and represents itself as a nation within the Canadian political landscape, has sought to control part of its immigration, but it has had to accommodate or challenge other aspects of public policy regarding how government deals with ethnocultural diversity.

This article first examines certain theoretical and normative aspects raised by issues of immigration and the handling of ethnocultural diversity. It then explores the Canadian and Quebec immigration policies. The aim is to situate the broader context in which points of convergence and divergence related to Quebec and Canadian realities are expressed. A third section analyzes the impact of international immigration and the resulting diversity on how Canada’s and Quebec’s identity-building has developed in sometimes contradictory ways. Finally, the article examines the mobilization that has occurred in the post-referendum context involving debates over Quebec citizenship.

International and domestic issues
in taking account of diversity

The globalization of migratory flows is increasing the ethnocultural diversity of western societies, suggesting that social relationships between majorities and minorities are constantly shifting. If globalization, in its broadest sense suggests in some minds a cosmopolitan and post-colonial project, interdependence within a society of networks, a broadening of democracy and of multicultural or global citizenship and a shifting of national identities (Cohen et Kennedy, 2000; Castles et Davidson, 2000a et 2000b; Delanty, 2000), others see the consolidation of a neoliberal project based on an institutionalized regime dominated by market deregulation and structural adjustment policies, including the privatization of profitable public resources (Felice, 2002) intended for the least fortunate members of society that encompass large fractions of racialized groups and indigenous peoples. This neoliberal project goes together with processes of impoverishment and even the racialization of poverty on a global scale, as well as violation of social rights. This occurs in a climate of insecurity that is likely to affect openness to multiculturalism as a public policy and political project.

These trends cannot fail to stimulate new analyses. Immigration and integration policies are becoming increasingly complex and contradictory, given the often irreconcilable aims of governments : a source of labour, lower social costs, upholding of public order, integration in public institutions, and preserving of national identity (Castells, 2000). Moreover, the post-9/11 context is marked by new priorities : the harmonization of immigration and integration policies and the balancing of civil liberties against security issues have become imperatives (Pellerin, 2003; Drache, 2004). This has led to new border management measures, information exchanges, internments, expulsions and even interceptions beyond borders. Cross-border travellers must acquire new identification documents (Canadian citizens must show their passports when arriving or transiting at American airports), use of biometric data is proliferating, etc. Despite economic pressures and perhaps to some extent because of them, border controls have become tighter. New legislative measures in the immigration field are making it easier to deport individuals suspected of participating in illicit activities. As noted by Crépeau and Nakache, “although the link between migration and security is not new, growing security concerns in the last few years have fundamentally changed the playing field of immigration regulation” (Crépeau and Nakache, 2006, p. 12). The situation has become more complex because of the connection established between terrorism and religion. According to the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène, the issue of racism is becoming more complex in the area of discrimination because of the blending of racial, cultural and religious factors in most recent crises and incidents (Diène, 2006a, p.4).

A normative debate on multiculturalism and its apprehended backlash (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004; Joppke, 2007; Kymlicka, 2008; Modood, 2007; Zapata-Barrero, 2007) is growing. In Europe and Canada, right-wing thinking is assailing the ideology of multiculturalism using simplified stereotypes such as “the tyranny of minorities”, “victim mentality”, “the watering-down of the Canadian identity”, “excesses in identity”, “growing balkanization of society”, etc. On the left, multiculturalism is rejected in favour of a postcolonial perspective, transnationalism or cosmopolitan citizenship (Labelle, 2008a).

Another central issue involves citizenship, not just citizenship rights but also the symbolic significance of citizenship and the way it creates a sense of belonging to a particular political community, beyond specific ethnocultural belonging and identity (Turner, 1997; Gamberale, 1997; Rocher, 1998; Tully, 2000; Joppke, 2007).

At another level of analysis, the tension resulting from the link between nation and ethnicity, from disappearing, is fuelling new political representations and arrangements in contemporary societies. Gilles Bourque defines the nation as a “collectivity with enduring memory” in the name of which we intervene in political struggles that deal with the demarcation of the spatial and communal frameworks within which democracy operates” (Bourque, 2000, p.169). The author distinguishes between two types of nation : the majoritarian (or dominant) nation which builds itself through the process of assimilating a number of different communities (the American and French model); the minority (or dominated) nation, referring to communities with long memories that have resisted the process of assimilation by political means in a democratic state and have presented themselves as distinct political communities (Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia, etc.) (idem). Both types of nation are the result of political and cultural building processes (nation building) that take hold within a framework of power relationships that is constantly being renewed (idem, p.168).

From a sociological point of view, ethnicity, or the ethnicization and racialization of minority groups, continues to be a factor of social differentiation and political mobilization, in the same way as social class, sex or age. Ethnicity manifests itself through identity options and individuals’ sense of belonging as well as through community structuring. Immigrant, ethnic and religious movements are demanding recognition within the public space in the name of social justice and cultural rights, but these all have their own contradictions : “while developing out of the expansion of democracy, they are in some cases characterized by communitarian closure. In all cases, they are indirect reactions to the changes in identities and nation-states brought about by the globalization process” (Dubet, 2004, p.701). Ethnicity can also be studied in relation to structural factors and constraints that are imposed on individuals and groups, assigning them to specific social positions : segmentation of the job market, role of the state and public institutions, role of political parties and public opinion. These operate at the local, national and international level.

In a context of constant crossovers, social and organized movements as well as policies and public institutions contribute to a dynamic redefinition and rebuilding of the way ethnicity, nation and citizenship are presented within society. This can focus on specific forms of belonging, which comes from transcendence through citizenship (Schnapper, 1994; Labelle et Lévy, 1995, pp.270-271; Lecours, 2002; Banting, Courchene et Seidle, 2007).

In the Canadian context, the federal state has pursued the following goal : make immigrants and members of ethnic minorities primarily responsible for their status as Canadian citizens; in other words, maintaining national unity and territorial integrity through an active “Canadianization” of new immigrants.

This remarkable endeavour of nation building to which we have become accustomed in the last forty years, as well as the strengthening of rituals attached to Canadian citizenship, have not undermined the process of ethnicization and racialization connected to the management of federal immigration, multicultural and citizenship policies. Particular social categories are constantly having identities assigned to them (e.g. the notion of visible minorities). The state categorizes, designates, selects and finances groups, as well as their formal or informal leaders, on this basis (Brass, 1991; Kobayashi, 1992; Bilge, 2004; Lamont et Bail, 2005). In return, the associative movement mobilizes along the same lines as regards the state (Otayek, 2000, p.31). Within civil society, ethnicity remains an important mobilization factor, particularly in societies influenced by the British tradition. This tradition recognizes that “to ensure true human freedom in the face of power that risks becoming arbitrary, there is a need to respect the diversity of particular belonging and attachments”, as opposed to the French tradition, which is unitary and hostile to pluralism (Schnapper, 1994, p.91).

Quebec, characterized by the dual influence of both French and British traditions, cannot escape this dynamic. A “patriotic space” has developed since the mid-1960s, seeking to create a “community of citizens” that is neutral, a-ethnic, within the framework of strong autonomy or independence. The numerous ways in which the Quebec nation and citizenship are represented, including identity markers, have been built socially and politically, but they have all had to deal with manifestations of ethnicity or “minority spaces” (Laguerre, 1999; Labelle, 2005a), and that have evolved over time. What is striking is that Quebec has sought to build its own public policies for managing diversity, sometimes complementary to, and sometimes in opposition to, policies adopted by the federal government.

These are the convergences and divergences that we will explore.

Quebec immigration policy
in the Canadian context

To begin, it should be emphasized that, with the exception of First Nations, the Canadian population is the product of immigration related to colonization and economic processes. The non-indigenous population of Canada, which began at the time of New France, grew in successive waves of immigration, French and then British after the conquest of 1759. It should be recalled that the ethnic composition of the French population was far from homogenous : French settlers came from several different French provinces and displayed considerable cultural differences. Similarly, the early Anglo-Saxon population consisted of Loyalists fleeing the American Revolution (close to 40,000 in total, of whom 6,000 settled in Quebec) as well as immigrants coming from various parts of the United Kingdom : Irish Catholics and Protestants, Scots and English (Harvey, 1987). Canada’s original political, economic and social institutions were thus based on the presence of “two founding peoples”, French Canadians and English Canadians, to which other ethnic groups joined as Canada matured. “Ethnic minorities” were groups belonging to neither of the two “founding” peoples.

Starting in the late 19^th century, Canadian immigration policy was characterized by a desire to populate Western Canada to ensure economic expansion with immigrants drawn essentially from Britain, continental Europe and the United States. This immigration policy, which discriminated against Asians, blacks and, later, Jews fleeing Europe (Labelle, Larose and Piché, 1983; Li, 1998 and 2003), was pursued until 1962, when the Canadian government modified its policy to adopt uniform, non-racial selection criteria. With the goal of responding to economic and demographic needs, a system of points was instituted in 1967. Requests for immigration were evaluated using pre-determined criteria that took account of age, health, knowledge of French or English, education, professional training etc. A new Immigration Act was introduced in 1978. In addition to demographic and economic objectives, new social (reunification of families), humanitarian (welcoming of refugees) and political (respect for international treaties) goals were added (Labelle, 1988).

These legislative modifications, as well as geopolitical events, created a diversification in immigration to Canada. While Canadian immigration had essentially came from Europe before the 1970s, the contemporary period has seen substantial numbers of immigrants from Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Maghreb and Asia. However, the geographical distribution of immigration within Canada has been very uneven. Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec receive by far the most immigrants, particularly in the cities of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. In 2001, 18.4% of the Canadian population was born outside Canada but the percentage of residents born abroad was much higher in these three cities. 

The non-integration of immigrants into French Canadian society has been the subject of constant anxiety and has nourished the defensive reflexes of French Canadians in regard to their Catholic and French identity (Harvey, 1987). While immigration is a shared responsibility under the British North American Act (BNA act) of 1867 (with the preponderance of powers given to the federal level), it was not until the end of the 1960s that the Quebec government created a Department of Immigration. During the Quiet Revolution, characterized by modernization of the provincial state and the transformation of Quebec nationalism (Rocher, 2002), Quebec decided to try to affirm its role in the field of immigration and exercise greater control over the selection and recruitment of immigrants. The result was a series of federal-provincial agreements.

These agreements were made possible not only by the desire of Quebec to develop its own immigration and immigrant policies but also by a change of philosophy on the part of the Canadian government. Until that time, immigration policy had not taken account of the interests of French Canadians in the recruitment of immigrants. Rather, Canada attempted to increase English-speaking immigration, and information on immigration was only available in English. Moreover, federal policies explicitly restricted immigration from Asia and Africa. In the mid- 1960s, Canada finally ended this approach to immigration that was both racist and contrary to Canada’s French-English duality. However, it was not until 1974 that the federal government recognized, in the Green Book presented by Immigration Minister Robert Andras, that immigration was a shared federal and provincial responsibility and attempted to restore a certain balance. Public consultations following publication of the Green Book led to a series of recommendations that would become the foundation of the new Immigration Act adopted in 1976 and applied starting in 1978.

The first Quebec-Canada immigration agreement was signed in 1971 and had the modest aim of allowing agents from Quebec’s Department of Immigration to inform immigration candidates about Quebec, using the federal government’s network of foreign offices. A 1975 agreement accorded a more active role for Quebec agents by permitting them to act as counsellors to the federal government for candidates wishing to settle in Quebec. The Cullen-Couture Agreement (Canada-Quebec Agreement on Immigration and the Selection of Foreign Nationals) reached in 1978 gave a preponderant role to Quebec in the selection of immigrants. Quebec obtained the power to select candidates from foreign countries who wished to settle in Quebec and to control the movement of temporary migrants (workers and students). Quebec thus gained a major role with respect to independent immigrants, who were selected based on economic and social criteria.  In making its selections, Quebec developed a points system that was only slightly different from that used by the federal government (see the grid in the appendix). As for permanent immigration, Quebec was given the responsibility to grant selection certificates while the federal government retained the power to distribute immigrant certificates involving the right to residency (after having made the necessary health and national security checks). Starting in 1978, Quebec could thus determine its objectives regarding the volume and composition of its immigration intake while respecting the framework of the Canadian Immigration Act. The federal government kept control over its borders and admission and selection of persons requesting refugee status. At the same time, Quebec agreed to respect the immigrant categories defined by federal legislation : independent immigrants, family members and persons in situations of distress.

The most recent Quebec-Canada agreement on immigration was signed in 1991. The Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens (more commonly known as the Gagnon-Tremblay-McDougall Agreement, named after the ministers of immigration for Quebec and Canada) set out the responsibilities of each government. The federal government remained responsible for establishing the annual volume of immigration for Canada, criteria for staying in Canada (length of visits, authorizations to work and study), categories of immigrants, family sponsorship and requests for asylum. Quebec obtained exclusive responsibility for three areas related to permanent immigration : 1) the number of immigrants it wished to receive; 2) the selection of candidates who wanted to settle on its territory (with the exception of immigrants requesting refugee status and immigrants in the family reunification category); 3) management and enforcement of commitments pertaining to sponsorship and the determination of the length of such commitments. With respect to temporary immigration, Canada had to obtain Quebec’s consent regarding : 1) the granting of work permits; 2) the granting of study permits and the admission of foreign students (except for students participating in federal government programs to assist developing countries); and 3) authorization of visitors to enter Canada to receive medical treatment.

The 1991 agreement aimed at protecting the demographic weight of Quebec within Canada and promoting the integration of immigrants with respect to Quebec’s “distinct character” (Section 2). In this spirit, the Government of Canada agreed to ensure that Quebec received a percentage of total immigration equal to its portion of the Canadian population with the right (yet to be exercised) of exceeding this proportion by 5% for demographic reasons. The federal government also agreed to consult Quebec on the total number of immigrants it intended to take in. For its part, Quebec was obliged to take in a percentage of refugees at least equal to the percentage of total immigrants it wished to take in. The federal government continued to determine criteria concerning family reunification, while Quebec was given responsibility for applying these criteria on its territory as well as responsibility for enforcing commitments related to sponsorship and to set the financial standards that sponsors must meet. Canada kept the exclusive power to grant refugee status, but Quebec was given the power to choose which refugees would do best to settle in Quebec and to refuse refugees who did not meet its criteria. Visitors (students, temporary workers and people seeking medical care) could be admitted to Quebec only with its consent. As such, Quebec has direct control over the selection process for “economic” immigrants, who represent over half of all recent immigrants, and Quebec plays a fairly active role in the selection of immigrants in other categories (Young, 2004).

It is important to note that the Gagnon-Tremblay-McDougall Agreement committed the federal government to transfer reception, language and cultural integration services to Quebec along with financial resources for the Quebec government to meet these new responsibilities.

This outline of Canadian and Quebec policies in the area of immigration gives only a general idea of the institutional arrangements that have been put in place to select immigrants. The integration of immigrants is a complex policy area and is the subject of specific policies of reception, labour market insertion, French language instruction, and accreditation of foreign diplomas and skills training. Integration also requires the receiving society to be open to diversity and to embark on reciprocal adjustment of its implicit and explicit dominant values.

Beyond well-intentioned statements in favour of diversity, discrimination (often systematic) is faced by immigrants when seeking housing, employment or public education, health and recreational services (Reitz, 2005, Labelle, 2005b, p. 78; Labelle, Field et Icart, 2007). Moreover, the accommodation of religious practices can also be source of problems, especially with an education system (an area of provincial jurisdiction) that aims to be secular.

While the issue of racism emerged in the 1970s in connection with the controversy surrounding the limits of federal policy on multiculturalism, recent studies show that, in the international geopolitical context and the current internal situation, racism is “an important public policy issue” (Patel, 2007, p.259). For this reason, in 2005, the Canadian government agreed to embrace the principles of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and to follow up on the report by Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004). Canada’s Action Plan Against Racism and a law to prevent racial profiling (Bill C-476 in 2004) were adopted. The Quebec government plans to release its own plan to fight racism.

Involvement by both levels of government in fighting racism and integrating immigrants means that these policies advance strategies that are not always complementary. Moreover, each level colours its policies with a vast discourse on the integrating society whose shapes and borders are not always identical. To these issues must be added the problem of economic integration (recognition of diplomas, labour training, income security, etc.) that requires the establishment of public policies that fall under the powers devolved to the provinces. It is therefore understandable that the governments’ economic aims, along with the management of public policies for the integration of immigrants, are not always in accordance with each other.

The comings and goings
of “do-it-yourself” identity

The Quebec social state has developed closely tied to heavy investment in the “national” area, whether involving moves toward greater provincial autonomy or the independence project. Political discourse falls within this patriotic space. For Boismenu, Dufour and Saint-Martin :

The definition of the political framework, for a government that represents a minority community in a country whose institutional framework is federalism, necessarily supports a definition of “us”, meaning a community that participates in a larger group but that nonetheless stands apart. The identity of this community is a major element : it fuels ambitions and draws a horizon (our translation, 2004, p. 103).

Surveys and qualitative studies broadly show the process of rebuilding national identity that is going on in Quebec. The proportion of Quebecers who identify themselves with Quebec first and foremost has gone from 21% to 59% in the last 20 years (Bernier, Lemieux et Pinard, 1997); 29% consider themselves Quebecers first and Canadians second, whereas 28% define themselves as both Quebecker and Canadian. In another study along similar lines : 63% of the French-speaking population identified itself as Quebecers, 26% as French-Canadian and just 11% as Canadian only. In comparison, 70% of English-speakers in Quebec saw themselves as Canadians and a mere 5% as Quebecers (Bernier, 1998). According to political analyst Jean-François Lisée, while 51% of allophones (of neither French nor English mother tongue) defined themselves as being Canadian in 1979, this proportion rose to 70% in 1999 (Lisée, 2000, p.189).

Among the children of Bill 101, also known as “Generation 101”, Quebec identity is gaining ground. A survey conducted in 2003 covering 1,025 young people (born outside Quebec or with parents born outside Quebec) found that 28% had adopted a Quebec identity compared to 34% with a Canadian identity; 67% regarded Quebec as a nation distinct from the rest of Canada; 40% were favourable to Quebec sovereignty linked to a partnership with the rest of Canada for economic (budget control), political (autonomy, decision-making power) and cultural (language protection) reasons (Beaulieu, 2004, pp.5-6).

To understand the issues linked to identity terminology in Quebec, it is necessary to know that the Quebec government has used the term “cultural communities” since the 1980’s with the creation of the Ministry of cultural communities and immigration of Quebec in 1981. This is unique to Quebec society and historically involves diverse categories of population. [1] The term “visible minority”, used by the federal government in running employment equity programs, has only recently been introduced into the Quebec government’s administrative lexicon. [2]

What meaning can be drawn from the transformation of identity options? First, there is the dynamic of the “do-it-yourself” identity : a minority ethnic identity, that of French Canadian, has been taken and another identity, the Québécois citizenship and political identity, has been superimposed on it or chosen exclusively. This citizenship identity is inclusive : it recognizes the internal diversity of the political community and leaves room for ancestral identities while seeking to break the historic dichotomy between Quebec and cultural communities or between Quebec and visible minorities, which has become institutionalized in the public space. In political discourse, the term Québécois has come to be understood in various ways : one can be simply a Québécois, or a Québécois of Lebanese descent, or an Italo-Québécois, etc. In all cases, there is a new articulation between nation/ethnicity and citizenship (Labelle et Salée, 2001, pp. 290-298; Labelle, 2005a; 2008b). As noted by Castells, this marks the transition from “the resistance identity produced by players who find themselves in positions or conditions that are disfavoured and/or stigmatized by the dominant context [...] to an identity project... where social players, on the basis of the cultural material they have, whatever it may be, build a new identity that redefines their position in society, and as such, proposes to transform the social structure as a whole” (our translation, Castells, 1999, p.18).

This transition has occurred through the dual influence of the transforming state and a reforming nationalism that has manifested itself in Quebec over the last fifty years (Venne, 2000; Marhraoui, 2004, p.53) as well as of social and associational movements (including the nationalist movement). These social forces have been inspired by the ideology of human rights, the promotion of cultural rights and the ideology of interculturalism and intercultural rapprochement. They have played a joint role in transforming the language and in how the nation is presented from a “people”, as shown by historical institutionalists (Lecours, 2002, p.15).

Canadian identity on the offensive

The recurring failures of constitutional talks between Canada and Quebec in the last two decades of the twentieth century (the unilateral repatriation of the Canadian constitution in 1981-1982 and its subsequent modification without the assent of the Quebec National Assembly, the failure of the 1990 Meech Lake constitutional agreement and the 1992 Charlottetown agreement) fundamentally are a growing reflection of opposition between national identities that have become consolidated as their political aspirations have been expressed, as asserted by the report of the Bélanger-Campeau Commission in 1991 (Quebec, 1991, p.31). Faced with this change, the Canadian government has greatly increased, since the late 1980s and especially since the 1995 referendum, actions with a form and content aim chiefly to instil, among Quebec citizens in general, and ethnic minorities in particular, the perception that the federal government represents a truly “national” government.

This identity offensive relies primarily on increasing the visibility of Canadian symbols in all areas of governmental activity. This endeavour has not been limited merely to seeking visible Canadian symbols. Canadian immigration, multiculturalism and citizenship policies have also been special tools for reorienting a sense of belonging and allegiance to Canada among newcomers and among Quebecers of all origins. These three policies have been fully amended and updated so that their respective goals fall in line with the new challenge of strengthening and consolidating Canadian identity.

Responding to criticisms from certain authorities in the Canadian Parliament that have underlined what they consider perverse effects resulting from the application of multiculturalism policy (the preservation and promotion of ancestral cultures at the expense of a sense of belonging to Canada), the federal government has developed a new strategy that emphasizes a more effective linkage between policies of bilingualism (formal equality between French and English, with the effect of hiding the former’s long-time fragility), multiculturalism (in constant tension both with the issue of a shared Canadian identity and with the struggle against racism and discrimination), immigration (insistence on the need for new immigrants to integrate with the Canadian model and to contribute to its social cohesion) and access to citizenship (allegiance to Canada). Citizenship has become an arena where the federal government pursues the aim of protecting national unity by giving immigrants and members of ethnic minorities a primary responsibility arising from their status as Canadian citizens : maintaining national unity and territorial integrity through the active “Canadianization” of new immigrants. Thanks to the “constructive effects” of the citizenship ceremony, the preeminence of the Canadian reference operates in the face of Quebec’s own identity symbols (see Labelle and Salée, 1999 and 2001; Marhraoui, 2004).

The progress noted in developing a sense of identification among recent immigrants in Quebec in the last few years has not only been blocked but has been reoriented to the Canadian pole (Lisée, 2000, p.189), despite “fundamentalization” and the racialization of their identities applying the notion of “visible minorities” defined through phenotypic and biological features.

In sum, supported by federal government initiatives, Canadian identity has succeeded in placing itself politically and symbolically between Quebec and its new citizens through its use of identity symbols, Canadian citizenship and federal multiculturalism policy. [3]

Quebec citizenship in progress,
or a citizen’s perspective

In the wake of the failed referendum in 1995, Quebec’s independentist government launched a new phase in the state development of identity and ethnocultural diversity in Quebec society. At the institutional level, this was marked by converting the former Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration to the Ministry of Relations with Citizens and Immigration (hereinafter MRCI), with a mandate to foster a sense of belonging in Quebec.

From a historical standpoint, this new legislative initiative represents an important political decision in the sense that the Quebec government is seeking to define a framework for a common citizenship capable of rallying the main components of society around a certain number of fundamental principles and premises : Quebec is a nation with a specific history, its own democratic institutions, a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a common public language, which is French. This introduces the idea of a civic contract that requires all Quebec citizens to respect the laws, to share democratic principles and values, to respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, to exercise civic and social responsibilities, to recognize the equality of persons (including between women and men), and to participate in national life. It also recognizes the historical status of Quebec’s English-speaking community and of the indigenous nations [4] while emphasizing the contribution of ethnic minorities to Quebec’s social, political and cultural life (Québec 2000; Labelle and Rocher, 2001). Varied public activities have been instituted to support this new vision actively : National Citizenship Week, the Citizenship Prize and other prizes recognizing civic merit.

In addressing all Quebec citizens, it is clear that the state seeks to affirm Quebec’s status as a framework for common life so as to remove any ambiguity regarding the inclusive nature of Quebec society and to rebuke the notion suggesting that it is solely a state for Francophones. Specifically, this meant ending the dichotomy between Quebecers and “cultural communities”.

The new thinking on Quebec citizenship kept its distance from the apostolic spirit of the moral contract released in a political statement in 1991, which shifted political debate to the tricky area of different sets of cultural values. It must be admitted that this moral contract was a metaphor that failed to hide its true political and symbolic intentions : defining the parameters of Quebec citizenship without being explicit so as not to confront its federal counterpart and to take account of the political and constitutional context in which it was brought out. [5]

The return to communitarian management,
or the temptations of communitarianism

The election of the federalist Quebec Liberal Party in April 2003 marked a turning point in Quebec’s intercultural policy (Quebec’s answer to multiculturalism) and also in its notion of Quebec citizenship.

It can be said that the evanescence of the idea of the Quebec nation (and its corollary, the elimination of any reference to citizenship), a strong return to the cultural aspect and to ethnicization (while still referring constantly to “cultural communities”) and the emergence of security as a theme are all aligned with the federal position.

For the Liberal government, Quebec always represented, at the most, a distinct society.[6] A 2004 government document attests to this fact : “A society in motion”, “at the heart of the Canadian federation and North America”, the uniqueness of which lies in “its common official language”, and “the identification of Quebec, its past and its destiny, are accompanied by an attachment to a group that Quebec belongs to entirely, the Canadian federation” (our translation, Gouvernement du Québec, 2004, p.11). But as the government document Shine Amongst the Best. The Priority and the Action Programs of the Quebec Government implies, this society is made up of “seven million ambitions”. In the words of Boismenu, Dufour and Saint-Martin, “Rarely have we seen a government providing such a vacuous description of Quebec society, taken as a national community, or on the conditions for fulfilling and developing its identity” (our translation, 2004, p.137-138)). In the discourse of the ruling provincial Liberals, Quebec society is shaped by its culture, and the political side is erased. This line of thinking is explained by “the apparent fear of having to commit itself to a community associated with a state (as provincial as it might be), endowed with a mission in keeping with recognitions of Quebec as a national community” (idem, 2004, p.106).

The new action plan, Shared Values, Common Interests (Québec, MRCI, 2004), contained 38 new initiatives set within five axes aimed essentially at ensuring that immigration meets economic needs (a skilled workforce, the selection of immigrants in relation to the needs of the labour market and recognition of foreign accreditation). In particular, three dimensions of the plan should be mentioned. First, the plan argues for the importance of a civic and normative framework within which members of ethnocultural communities should become integrated. Second, it emphasizes the need to ensure the survival of the French fact in Quebec by learning the French language. Finally, the plan stresses the importance of openness to diversity and the fight against racism and xenophobia (MICC, 2005). The action plan notes that both immigrants and the host society have certain responsibilities. In this context, diversity is not just an asset : it also entails problems and a need for social control :

Quebec is a democratic society where the expression of ethnic and religious rivalries is not tolerated any more than domestic violence is tolerated. The separation of church and state is a fundamental value as is equality between men and women and respect for French – the official language of Quebec – in public life. These values, which were outlined in the moral contract, are the foundation of successful integration of immigrants and the harmonization of intercultural relations within Quebec society (MRCI, 2004, p.80).

The administrative category of “cultural communities” reappears in the public space and the political field. This category is used to designate the ethnocultural diversity as opposed to the categories used by the former government, which spoke of “Quebecers of all origins” and “Quebec citizens from immigrant communities”, etc. The action plan targets only particular “clients” as opposed to Quebecers as a whole : it addresses “Quebecers from cultural communities”. Moreover, the ministry specified that “Quebec society is made up of over 100 cultural communities”. A liaison office specializing in relations with cultural communities, was set up : liaison officers are designated for “the black communities”, Asia and Oceania, the Maghreb, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America and the United States. [7] Each cultural community can refer back to its liaison officer.

One civil servant, interviewed for another study, noted that the Ministry’s approach toward minority groups changed with the “colour” of the government. Although the integration goal does not change for civil servants, he noted that the change from a Parti Québécois government to a Liberal government meant the end of a citizen-centred approach in favour of a communitarian approach. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. The “communitarian” approach adopted by the Quebec Liberal government is appreciated because it encourages work on the ground and makes it easier to identify each community’s needs. The citizen approach emphasizes the individual, the citizen, which is better for integration but risks becoming too abstract (civil servant, MICC).

In fact, all references to citizenship disappear. Citizenship Week is replaced by the Intercultural Meeting Week. As noted above, the idea of a “moral contract”, as it appeared in the Gagnon-Tremblay political statement in 1990 (MRCI, 2004a, p.5 and 80) resurfaces. Similarly, in 2005, the Ministry of Relations with Citizens and Immigration had a name change to Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities (MICC). Civic participation was reduced to a moral conception of the immigrant and “cultural communities”, contrasting with the previous vision of citizenship which involved “deliberate and responsible action by someone who has powers, responsibilities and rights, through which they affirm, or demand, their integration with the concerned milieu” (Picard, 2001, p.41). 

The re-ethnicization under way comes with a wheeler-dealer vision of ethnocultural diversity. To deal with the concentration of immigrants in the Montreal metropolitan area, the minister announced a close partnership with chambers of commerce and regional councils. Chambers of commerce are interested in public-private partnerships, with remuneration (Le Devoir, 2004). The number of immigrants selected in the economic immigrant category would be increased, which accordingly would reduce the number of refugees taken on by the state. A clear openness can be seen in the temporary work permit category (at the federal level) (MRCI, 2004), providing for more fluid management of those entering.

The 2004-2007 action plan lists security as a guiding principle of the policy : “For ensuring a secure process, the current international context requires that all precautions must be taken to avoid usurpation of identity or any other fraud and to contribute to national security” (MRCI, 2004a, p.8). In the words of Premier Jean Charest, security is a major issue in the relationship between Quebec and the United States (Chouinard, 2004, p.A3).

To sum up, Quebec policy is the result of a crossover between a citizen perspective and a communitarian discourse, with a divergence in underlying political interests. This same tension can be seen at the federal level, where a balance must be maintained between multiculturalism and strengthening Canadian citizenship. This requires managing a fundamental contradiction at the heart of any political community, emphasized here by the particular history of the Canadian federation and the growing diversification of the population. Quebec’s government, led by the Liberal party, has returned to the moral contract of 1990 in which notions of interculturalism, cultural communities and common public culture took centre stage in the way integration of Quebec diversity was approached. This is not only a return, but also an obliteration of any state policies put forward under Parti Québécois governments (Labelle, 2008c).

Ethnocultural minorities
and state management of diversity :
divided loyalties

Since the early 1980s, Quebec government discourse called for a sense of belonging to “Quebec culture”, then to “common public culture”, “a moral contract”, and finally “a civil reference framework” articulated around values and principles related to the collective life of Quebec society. These political values, cited in government documents, are as follows : the common French language, democratic values, equality between men and women, pluralism, basic human rights, secularism, collective solidarity, a shared common heritage and the recognition of the historical rights of the English-speaking minority of Quebec. These political values are not unanimously accepted within minority groups. The objectives of the common heritage, of secularism and of French as a public language in particular have led to disagreements over the years (Labelle and Salée, 2001).

Comparing federal multiculturalism policy with Quebec interculturalism policy has been the subject of various arguments aiming to demonstrate their respective superiority along with their convergences and divergences, as much by Quebec intellectuals as by ethnic and immigrant leaders (idem; Labelle, 2008c; Rocher, Labelle, Field and Icart, 2007).

Some English Canadian observers believe interculturalism is merely a modified version of Canadian multiculturalism. Federal policy has merely been a model, despite the fact that Quebec, at the crossroads of British tradition and French republican tradition, is seen as more integrationist (Garcea, 2006). These analyses are grounded in Kymlicka’s thinking according to which both policies are virtually identical, with both recognizing and accommodating liberal democratic principles (Kymlicka 2001, pp.280-281).

The controversy surrounding the political principles and values creating Quebec as a whole, which can be seen in debates on Quebec citizenship, were placed on the agenda by the Parti Québécois when the party was in power from 1996 to 2003. This vision of citizenship presented a conception different from Canadian-style multiculturalism.

It is evident that ethnocultural minorities are targeted directly by both levels of government. Their loyalty is solicited, politicized and ultimately instrumentalized by politicians who use them for their own aims of consolidating the identity within their respective spaces.

As a backdrop, mobilizing ethnocultural minorities for Quebec sovereignty has been a constant theme in Quebec politics. Numerous political factors have played out in the void between immigrants, ethnic minorities and the government, first in the context of Quebec’s 1995 sovereignty referendum and then in the context of debate over Quebec citizenship, brought to the table by the Parti Québécois while they were in power between 1996 and 2003 : a campaign smearing Quebec in the local, ethnic and national media and accusing the Quebec government and sovereignty movement of racism and “ethnic cleansing”; the creation of a partition movement promoting the divisibility of Quebec in the case of separation; and support given to the federalist cause by important Quebec leaders of various origins.

An example that took on emblematic proportions in political debate came from the words spoken by Jacques Parizeau, then premier of Quebec and leader of the sovereignty movement, on the night of the referendum defeat when he attributed the defeat to “money and the ethnic vote”. This played a major role in sparking a more explicit debate over the political position of minorities. The premier was reacting to tactics by the no side aimed at using ethnic groups to promote their option, a position put forward by a coalition directed by the Canadian Jewish Congress (Quebec section), the National Italian-Canadian Congress, and Canadian Hellenic Congress. At the same time, the Rassemblement des communautés culturelles pour le OUI represented the opposite side. Premier Parizeau’s comments fuelled a sense of resentment amongst minorities, as well as within the entire sovereignty movement. To allay these social and political conflicts, sovereignty leaders increased efforts aimed at disassociating themselves from Mr. Parizeau’s comments. Mr Parizeau took the initiative to write a letter of apology to the president of the Parti Québécois committee on intercultural relations (Parizeau, 1995). Many intellectuals and leaders from ethnocultural minorities pointed out that their “communities” did not speak with one voice and that in a liberal democracy all political positions are legitimate.

Another revealing example is the debate on the notion of citizenship put forward by the Quebec government in 1996. Many reactions were heard, some of them antagonistic. Kenneth Cheung, president of the Canadian Chinese Businessmen’s Association, noted that the official orientation of the government with its new minister for relations with citizens and immigration was inspired by the French republican, Jacobin and assimilationist model (Cheung, 2000). This change is proof, for some community leaders, of the intrinsically ethnocentric nature of the sovereignty movement in Quebec and represents one of three steps in the state’s assimilation project : the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101); the discourse on public common culture as defended in the policy statement on immigration and integration (Gagnon-Tremblay) in 1991; and finally, the discourse on citizenship under an independentist government.

Similar arguments were put forward in the context of a national forum on citizenship held in 2000 (Québec, 2000) by minority leaders who sought to invalidate the legitimacy of any project on Quebec citizenship. One leader from the English-speaking group Alliance Quebec noted : “For English-speaking Quebecers and indeed many other Quebec federalists […] if the government is acting in good faith, it should be made clear […] that the Quebec government's desire to instil pride in living in Quebec is not in any way meant to diminish the attachment most Quebecers have to being citizens of Canada or to diminish the important symbols of being part of Canada” (Housefather, 2000, p.B3). This criticism was recycled by many spokespersons who insisted that multiple allegiances and identities are the norm and not the exception, meanwhile defending a post-national model of citizenship (Labelle and Rocher, 2004, p.278-279). Critics of the government initiative came from various political horizons. As has been noted elsewhere, “If citizenship is essentially anchored in a political association, the ambiguity of the political status of Quebec, which is always defined as a sub-set of the Canadian political space, can only undermine a model of Québec citizenship” (idem).

However, support for government positions has also been manifested. Many Quebecers of various origins have welcomed the Quebec government’s new policy orientations in the area of citizenship. These changes mark a long-awaited change with respect to the discourse on citizenship that was needed to promote an inclusive representation of Quebec society and the de-ethnicization of Quebec society. This enthusiasm can be seen especially from among French-speaking minorities (Labelle and Salée, 2001, p.305; Marhraoui, 2004).

It should also be noted that, as a final example, Quebec was hit in 2006-2007 by a political earthquake in the form of “reasonable accommodation” in the workplace and public institutions, a shock that took plenty of space in the media and public opinion. As noted by Éric Bédard : “Today, the debate on reasonable accommodation has the same political and symbolic reach as the debate on language in the 1970s” (Bédard, 2007, p.A7).

In fact, this polemic has not only influenced the judicial conception of reasonable accommodation [8] but also the federal policy on multiculturalism and the Quebec version of interculturalism, secularisation of the public space, equality between men and women, and even the national question and Quebec sovereignty (Labelle and Icart, 2007; Quebec, 2007, 2008).

It was in this context that Parti Québécois leader Pauline Marois proposed two bills in the National Assembly : 195 (Quebec identity) and 196 (Quebec constitution). The bill on Quebec identity was aimed at giving Quebec an internal constitution, Quebec citizenship and a strengthening of the Charter of the French Language and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The legitimacy of her initiatives was quickly challenged by federalist supporters.

It is thus very clear that the major obstacle to developing a citizenship that conforms to the ideals of the Canadian or Quebec State, meaning a citizenship that involves a sense of belonging to the nation, lies above all in the incorporation of different models and the systematic discrimination of which many Canadians belonging to racialized groups are victims. Difficulties in their economic incorporation are almost always designated as the major obstacle to instilling a strong sense of belonging to the Canadian political community.

With regard more specifically to the Quebec context, the language issue and political tension around the national question also contribute to weakening any sense of belonging for a large number of citizens belonging to minority groups. Evidently, the sense of belonging varies enormously by group (French-speakers versus English-speaking minorities), with knowledge of French, length of residence and degree of integration into the Quebec society all being determining factors.

As such, the relationship ethnic minorities have with the Quebec citizenship project has profoundly changed over the last few decades. It is also important to note that the tension between nation, ethnicity/diversity and citizenship has undergone significant transformations : a “community of citizens” that cannot be reduced to a “community of communities” (Balibar, 1998) which shares a number of convictions on what it implies to “live together” and is presented as the path to choose.

Conclusion

There is a persistent tension between the representations of the nation, of ethnicity (multiculturalism at the federal level, interculturalism in Quebec) and citizenship in the Canadian and Quebec context. Battles to define the patriotic space that belongs to Quebec have been, and have remained, a constant concern for the federal government over the last decade, but this mandatory solicitation does not prevent the progress of a Quebec national identity toward which large segments of Quebec’s citizens from varied backgrounds are converging, weary of the ethnic tag that they have been and are still carrying.

Recent analysis by the Quebec government in the area of immigration and the accommodation of diversity reveals an alignment with federal policy : a business-like vision of immigration and diversity, partnership and control with NGOs in defending immigrants and “cultural communities”, a security mindset that has been imposed, and cuts to integration support budgets. Quebec’s specificity is added to these tendencies : a reduction and weakening of patriotic space under the Charest government. This government presents an atomist, cultural and bygone vision of Quebec society, denounced by nationalist-minded federalist factions within the Quebec Liberal Party.

Ethnocultural diversity is treated from a commercial-minded, management-oriented perspective, marked by the ideology of public-private partnerships. It continues to segment public space into particular administrative categories (“female immigrants”, “cultural communities”, “visible minorities”) to allow for the management of any dysfunctions in the system. However in doing so, and despite efforts to correct inequality and discrimination, the recent state discourse has had the perverse effect of favouring partition and the naturalizing and objectifying of social groups, and encouraging greater ethnicization of relationships between the government and minorities. It goes against an inclusive vision of Quebec citizenship.

Overall, this method of diversity governance continues, in the public space, to reproduce binary, obviously simplistic dichotomies : Quebecers and “cultural communities”, Quebecers and “visible minorities”, “us” and “them”, nation and communities. This discourse has maintained a relationship of exteriority between different components of the Quebec people.

Without a shadow of a doubt, debates on immigration, diversity and citizenship raise questions about major issues in Quebec and Canada. They reflect the multitude of interests within the government and in civil society. The debate also shows that it is simplistic to view the majority and minorities as having homogenous shapes. Beyond any normative discourse on the subject of multiculturalism, transnationalism and citizenship which often dominate in academic circles, this debate refers to the configuration of power relationships that characterize Canadian and Quebec society. In the end, the main issue is articulated, as noted by Nancy Fraser, around social justice expressed through two distinct paths : the redistribution of goods and resources (social question) and the respect of difference (identity question) (Fraser, 1998).

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