Micheline Labelle, Daniel Salée

Centre de recherche sur l'immigration, l'ethnicité et la citoyenneté (CRIEC)

“Immigrant and Minority Representations
of Citizenship in Quebec.”

Un article publié dans l’louvrage sous la direction de Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et Douglais B. Klusmeyer, Citizenship Today. Global Perspectives and Practices, pp. 278­315. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brookings Institution Press, 2001, 410 pp.

THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP ; CITIZENSHIP IN QUESTION

THE CHALLENGES TO CITIZENSHIP IN CANADA AND QUEBEC

The Canadian State and Citizenship

Citizenship and the Quebec state

IMMIGRANT AND MINORITY REPRESENTATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Identification, Identities and Citizenship

The dual or multiple character of identities

The relative salience of the Québécois identity

Immigrant views on Canadian citizenship

Canadian citizenship as instrument

Dual citizenship

Acquiring Canadian citizenship

Immigrant perspectives on Quebec citizenship

Dealing with the policy orientations of the Quebec state

Citizenship and political sovereignty

CONCLUDING REMARKS

State categorization of race and ethnicity

Economic exclusion, racial discrimination, and the underrepresentation of racialized minorities in the public sphere

Resistance to traditional ideas of citizenship and transnational orientations

The hegemonic influence of the federal policy of multiculturalism

The status of French as the common public language of Quebec

Attitudes towards Quebec nationalism and sovereignty

APPENDIX: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP ;
CITIZENSHIP IN QUESTION

During the past decade, most western societies have been looking for institutional and political ways to renew their approaches to citizenship [1]. This renewal has taken shape mainly through immigration policies which increasingly tend to emphasize the development of control mechanisms aimed at regulating immigrant entry [2] It is in fact part and parcel of a socio-political and ideological vision which brings into focus issues of security and acts as "a moralizing discourse, articulated around the idea of anomie and the loss of values" [3].

As the illegal fringe of international immigration is often perceived and presented as a significant threat to the health and security of citizens of existing states, several OECD countries are now committed to policies designed to enhance and strengthen their control over immigration. The guiding logic behind this policy overhaul is based upon a two-pronged strategy which both emphasizes interstate planning over the harmonization of immigration laws and entry procedures [4] and relies on measures meant to restrict access to citizenship, whether acquired by naturalization or by filiation [5]. Clearly, the laws and policies structuring international immigration and access to citizenship are being re-elaborated from new political and normative bases.

The pressures of globalization and transnationalism compound the problem as new migratory flows transform social fabrics, and diasporic longings stretch beyond national boundaries, raising concerns about the future of the nation-state. Like most other western societies today, Canada is also grappling with particularistic agendas based on issues of identity, individual rights and compensation for past injustices which have come to take center stage in the political process. As they express minority voices long kept to silence, they are forcing serious reconsideration of dominant social practices and patterns of power, and by extension, they are questioning age-old institutional setups that had hitherto largely remained unchallenged. Conversely, to those who feel aggressively interpellated and undermined by these agendas, the integrity of the political community is at stake and social cohesion is threatened.

In order to cope with this new, emerging environment the Canadian state has, in the past decade, modified its immigration policies and revised some of the parameters by which it traditionally defined citizenship. In the hope to defuse Quebec's sovereignist claims, strenghten social cohesion, consolidate political unity and bring about a renewed sense of loyalty to the Canadian nationality, policies aimed both at tightening up the conditions for acquiring Canadian citizenship and at developing a deep-seated sentiment of belonging to Canada, particularly among immigrants, have been put forward.

Quebec, for its part, driven as it is by a will to independent statehood, is also wrestling with the social and political imperatives of citizenship. Though its aspirations are denied by the Canadian state, it still seeks to impose itself as a virtual state within the state and is striving to develop its own conception of citizenship, based on a distinct vision of the Quebec political community. Like the Canadian state, the Quebec state is working toward the emergence of a socially entrenched sense of belonging and a universally accepted political language, a common civic framework that would unite all those residing on the Quebec territory despite their differences.

While the policies of the Quebec state are motivated by political aims significantly different from those pursued by the Canadian state, they too seek to consolidate the unity of the political community. As a result, immigrant and minority groups in Quebec are often made to choose between two competing visions of citizenship and belonging, a situation which many among them find perplexing, and which often complicates the politics of interethnic relations in Quebec. In order to shed some light on this situation, we have recently attempted in a series of qualitative interviews conducted in multiethnic Montreal neighborhoods to explore how state intentions with regard to citizenship are actually perceived by community activists who come from ethnic and racialized minorities in Quebec (see research methodology in the annex).

Our fieldwork essentially took place in Montreal as this city offers interesting and highly relevant features for a study of this kind. Almost 9 in 10 immigrants living in Quebec reside in Montreal and the ethnic origin of more than one third of the Montreal population is neither French nor Anglo-Celt.  Politically, Montreal is also Canada's center stage for debates over issues of belonging and membership, which underscore the citizenship question. Indeed, competition between Canada and Quebec for the civic allegiance and loyalty of citizens is more salient there than anywhere else in the country.

The data and research upon which this paper is based complements the information collected since the late 1980s in a series of fieldworks conducted by the researchers of the Centre de recherche sur l'immigration, l'ethnicité et la citoyenneté on issues of integration, nation, diversity and community in Quebec.

This paper comprises two main parts : first, we provide an overview of current Canadian and Quebec discourses on citizenship ; then, we confront these with the visions of citizenship that emerged during our latest fieldwork.

THE CHALLENGES TO CITIZENSHIP
IN CANADA AND QUEBEC

The Canadian State and Citizenship

Following the failure of the Meech Lake constitutional Accord in 1990, the Canadian government launched a massive process of public consultation over the renewal of Canada. A number of task forces, working groups, town hall meetings and parliamentary committees discussed the future of Canada as a political community.  This operation led to a new constitutional accord (the Charlottetown Accord) which was also defeated in a 1992 national referendum. During those years of heightened public debates, the Canadian state engaged in an in‑depth reflection about the terms and constitutive parameters of "Canadianness", and over the means which would best facilitate the integration of immigrants and ethnocultural minorities into the mainstream of Canadian society. A number of departments and bureaucratic agencies were summoned up to the task of reconstructing the national unity discourse [6]. The propositions made by official stakeholders did not always converge. As the Canadian political community was particularly strained by the vying for attention of competing national allegiances (Aboriginal people and Quebecers) [7], they expressed different positions and nuances of opinions with regard to the best possible way of ensuring national unity and greater social cohesion.  The interface between multiculturalism and citizenship was at the center of discussions, and in the end the notion of citizenship emerged as a pivotal concept. Interestingly though, while most governmental documents refer to the idea of citizenship in its broadest sociopolitical sense, in their actual treatment of it issues related to immigration stand out. Conceptually, the Canadian state's understanding of citizenship is largely determined by the question of immigrant integration [8].

In 1994, the Honorable Sergio Marchi, then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, requested the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Citizenship and Immigration to review the 1977 version of the Canadian Law on Citizenship in order to "modernize" the legislation. The Minister's aim was unequivocal : in his mind and that of his government, it was important that immigrants be well integrated into Canadian society, that they understand what being Canadian really means, and that they learn to appreciate and adopt the core values and principles that define Canadian society ; hence, a new citizenship law would foster greater appreciation of the benefits of Canadian citizenship on the part of immigrants. [9]

Clearly, the issue of citizenship arises essentially in response to the challenges immigration seems to pose to the integrity of the Canadian social fabric. While still open to immigration, the Canadian state is concerned that as "resources once plentiful are now dear" [10], it may put a stress on Canada's ability to integrate newcomers viably and equitably. Hence, in recent years, immigration targets have been reduced (from roughly 250,000 new entrants annually in the early 1990 to around 200,000 currently). But more significant is the federal government's insistence on welcoming mainly financially independent immigrants and, as the case may be, genuine refugees and asylum seekers. Also notable are the government's emphasis on "responsible" immigrants, and concerns over some of the perverse effects induced by the globalization of migrations (the importation of criminal activities through certain immigrant connections, for example, is a major source of governmental worries).

In the end, in its attempt to redefine the parameters of Canadian citizenship the Canadian state is in fact establishing in no uncertain terms that it intends to control more closely the "quality", the volume and the sources of the migration flows to Canada. The thrust behind recent legislative measures and regulations with regard to immigration is to make sure that immigrants become fully integrated Canadian citizens. [11] And there can be no doubt as to the nature of the engagement that is expected of them : in the words of a Privy Council document, citizenship is first posed as "an emotional tie, a sense of shared values and commitments to our country. Our shared Canadian citizenship provides a focus for unity that encompasses its parts, and brings our people together" [12]. Or as the members of the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Citizenship and Immigration put in their 1994 report : "Diversity is one of Canada's enormous strengths, but the importance of the whole must be emphasized. We must be a choir not a cacophony" [13].

Immigration is part and parcel of Canada's national and historical makeup, but it has become clear that in order to minimize the impact of recent migratory movements, globalization and the attendant tendency to social fragmentation, the Canadian state is looking to foster the kind of immigration that will readily enhance social cohesion and conform to the established, normative parameters of Canadian society. Unsurprisingly, the state discourse on citizenship remains essentially addressed to immigrants and to ethnocultural minorities whose integration into the Canadian mainstream may be implicitly perceived as problematic by the state and the general population. The state's message to them is loud and clear : the acquisition of Canadian citizenship is a "great privilege" [14] ; once bestowed upon anyone it should command unconditional allegiance to Canada, its norms, values and priorities. [15]

In the eyes of the Canadian state, Canadian citizenship is not a given. While it admittedly opens access to an attractive array of rights, the benefits of Canadian citizenship entails obligations and responsibilities. This is more than a simple rhetorical urging. In the wake of the restructuring of the Canadian welfare state, more emphasis than ever is put on individual responsibility as a criterion of good civic-mindedness. As the state gradually reduces its intervention in the social field, citizens are expected to assume more responsibilities in occupying the space left vacant by public powers.

The emphasis on responsibility serves to convey in no uncertain terms the idea that Canadian citizenship must be deserved and comes with its own set of moral and political requirements. As a 1996 information brochure distributed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada reminds Canadians - and in particular new Canadians - being a good Canadian citizen implies "being loyal towards Canada ; being loyal towards the Queen of Canada and her representatives ; obeying Canadian laws ; respecting the rights of others ; respecting private and public property ; taking care of the Canadian heritage ; upholding the ideals of Canada" and, of course, subscribing to the values of democracy, compassion and tolerance which the Canadian state holds as fundamental.

By insisting on linking citizenship, individual responsibility and partnership with the Canadian state, the government's discourse hints obliquely that a number of immigrants may be tempted to abuse Canadian citizenship, and that this situation must be prevented [16]. Immigrants are accountable to society and to state institutions. The onus is on them to demonstrate that they deserve to be incorporated into the Canadian political community. "Integration...is about finding a place in Canadian society, about a sense of belonging, and about assuming the rights and responsibilities of being Canadian. It is about being able to take part - free of barriers - in Canadian life" [17], explains one government document. It is the duty of immigrants and members of ethnic minorities to adapt to the existing cultural and institutional norms which are already in place and not the other way around.

The discourse of the Canadian state on citizenship is ideologically rooted in the non-negotiable expectation that immigrants and ethnic minorities will bind their sense of loyalty and their allegiance to the Canadian state, first and foremost. As Quebec and aboriginal nationalisms seem to threaten the structural integrity of the Canadian state and the unity of the Canadian political community, the federal government feels compelled to counteract their influence by establishing once and for all the primacy of Canadian citizenship [18]. The emphasis on loyalty, allegiance and responsibility is in fact meant to "reflect the true value of Canadian citizenship" [19]. Immigrants may be allowed to carry dual citizenship [20], but to the Canadian state there should be no question as to where their primary loyalty should lie : Canadian citizenship is an invaluable good and should be treated as such by those upon whom it has been bestowed.

The expectation repeatedly expressed in recent years by the Canadian state that immigrants give primacy of loyalty and attachment to Canada may seem perplexing when considered in contrast to the multiculturalism policy which, since 1971, has determined the state's attitude toward immigrants and its general approach to ethnocultural plurality.  As defenders and supporters of Canada's multiculturalism policy usually point out [21], the policy is premised on the possibility for immigrants and ethnocultural minorities to preserve, celebrate and develop their original identity.  Hyphenated identities, they argue, are at the core of multiculturalism in Canada and are indeed legitimated through funding of ethnic groups and ethnic cultural activities by the state ; the legalization of dual citizenship is further proof of the legitimacy and acceptability of multiple civic allegiances in the Canadian context.

The fact is, since the multiculturalism policy was implemented in the early 1970s, there has always been at the heart of the state's own conception of Canadianness a tension between its stated will to acknowledge ethnocultural diversity as a central feature of Canadian society, and its growing concern for unity and social cohesion.  As the recognition of diversity often translates on the ground into particularistic claims for a greater degree of administrative, jurisdictional or more simply symbolic autonomy the integrity of the state and the cohesiveness of society are put to test, sometimes painfully.  Reconciling the sovereignty of the individual — which the multiculturalism policy and a whole panoply of individual rights-oriented mechanisms protect — and the state imperatives of collective unity and cohesion often proves more complicated in the reality of everyday politics.

Through most of the 1970s and part of the 1980s, a fairly unconstrained multiculturalism was favored.  By the late 1980s however, the changing nature and shifting sources of immigration combined to the pressures of Quebec nationalism and Aboriginal claims concerned many who felt that multiculturalism might fragment rather than unify the Canadian political community.  The 1988 review of the Multiculturalism Act reflected somewhat this concern as it took pain to emphasize the commonalities of all Canadians (shared values, shared purpose, solidarity) over the constitutive diversity of Canadian society.  But in spite of the refurbishing of the Act, the concern did not abate.  A 1996 report of the Department of Canadian Heritage evaluating multiculturalism programs conceded that large segments of the Canadian public were ambivalent about multiculturalism.  Their ambivalence, noted the report, "is attributable, at least in part, to their perception that multiculturalism has the potential for threatening social cohesion by encouraging the retention of ethnocultural identification".  This observation prompted the authors of the report to conclude that "Canadians have not fully accepted Canada's unique status as a "multi-national" and "poly-ethnic" state" [22].

The changes in policy content around multiculturalism and citizenship in recent years have thus emerged largely in response to the public's and officials' admonitions that people interested in taking up Canadian citizenship must be made to understand that "loyalty to Canada must be given pride of place" [23].  In this spirit, the ongoing renewal of multiculturalism is focussed on a three-pronged approach that clearly emphasizes citizenship values : Canadian identity — people of all backgrounds should "feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada" — civic participation — they must be "active citizens", concerned to "shape the future of their communities and their country — and social justice — they must be involved in "building a society that ensures fair and equitable treatment and that respects the dignity of and accomodate people of all origins" [24].

In the nearly thirty-year period between the first multiculturalism policy and the process of policy renewal currently underway, the Canadian state has progressively moved to resolve the perennial tension between multiculturalism and citizenship in favor of the latter, at least for now.  While state rhetoric continues to insist on the advantages and benefits of diversity, Canadian policy makers can hardly conceal their wish that identities of all kinds be subsumed into a global, more encompassing and generalized Canadian civic identity.  Few among them, if any, would openly call for the abandonment of the multiculturalism policy though the current concern over social cohesion has many yearning for an unequivocally unified vision of the Canadian political community in which immigrants and new Canadians would unquestioningly endorse and rally around Canada's existing — and historically determined — value system and sense of self.  The Canadian state may not demand of immigrants strict adherence to its defining socioinstitutional parameters, as imperatively as other countries are wont to do ; still, the kind of immigrant integration it is now favoring is clearly meant to pave the way to an unambiguous, unitary citizenship.

Citizenship and the Quebec state

Quebec citizenship does not exist in the legal sense as Quebec is not yet constituted as a sovereign political entity. However, as a result of the nationalist strivings of the past three decades and Quebec's own insistence to be acknowledged as a distinct political or national space within the Canadian federation, most Quebecers today are imbued with a clear, Quebec-based sense of identity and community. Since the early 1960s, the Quebec jurisdiction has been operating in many ways as a de facto state which constantly calls upon the residents of the territory upon which it is allowed to legislate to embrace Quebec as their primary home of civic attachment. The state-building process which has led, among other things, to the secularization of most institutions, the recognition of French as the official language of public transactions, various legislations for the protection of minority cultures and languages and direct administrative involvement in immigrant selection and integration, has contributed to the construction of a readily identifiable, collective civic consciousness, that is to the development of a space of citizenship that is distinctly Québécois. As a result, most Quebecers, especially within the French-speaking majority, are and feel unquestionably Québécois [25].

To large segments of ethnocultural minorities, though, things are not so clear. While some do willingly proclaim their civic Québécois identity, most will insist to be identified as Canadian first and generally resist the prospect of Quebec's sovereignty. The distance which separates them from the mainstream of Québécois society is a source of tensions with the Francophone majority. These tensions inevitably bring to the fore the question of their sense of belonging, their inclusion, or their incorporation into Quebec society. Citizenship, then, to the extent that it is intimately associated with belonging, has indeed become quite a central issue in Quebec.

Over the past decade, in an effort to foster intercultural coexistence and instill all Quebecers, regardless of their origin, with a sense of being Québécois — in the civic understanding of the term — the Quebec state has developed and clarified its position on issues of belonging to Quebec society. In 1990, a document titled Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration of 1990 : Let's Build Quebec together was proposed by the Liberal government as the mainstay of the official discourse on immigration and integration. This statement presents Quebec as a distinct society. This notion of distinct society implies that "a clear affirmation of the French-speaking community and institutions as the pivot for the integration of newcomers is essential if the perennial reality of the French Fact is to be assured in Quebec"[26]. It further suggests an integration plan for immigrants and "cultural communities" based on the idea of a moral contract as the foundation upon which Quebecers of all origins can build together Quebec's future. This essentially implies that newcomers to Quebec should fully assume their responsibilities in the development of the host society and live by the tenets of a "common public culture", that is, shared values and universally agreed upon rights and sociopolitical practices.

The moral contract is a citizenship pact of sorts which rests on three central parameters of social interaction and intercommunity relations to which anyone living in Quebec should adhere : Quebec is "a society in which French is the common language of public life" ; it is "a democratic society where everyone is expected and encouraged both to participate and contribute to public debate" ; it is also "a pluralist society that is open to multiple influences within the limits imposed by the respect for fundamental democratic values and the need for intergroup exchanges" [27], that is, essentially, a society which offers peaceful resolution of conflicts, guarantee of collective and individual rights and liberties provided by laws (to the point of adapting institutional practices to suit individual and cultural specificities), anti-discriminatory legislation, gender equality, secularism of the state, equal and universal access to health and social services.

The Quebec state's willingness to transcend the historical ethnolinguistic marker of Quebec society is genuine, but, as the Conseil des relations interculturelles du Québec [28] has noted, though its approach is meant to elicit immigrant endorsement of the founding principles of Quebec society, and uphold the necessity to adapt institutions, it remains fraught with perplexity on the part of immigrants and non-Francophone minorities [29] : the lack of information as to the intended goals of the approach, the gap between principles and reality, the absence of concrete policies in line with the principles and the uneasy application of the policies that do exist are most commonly cited as the major stumbling blocks accounting for this perplexity.

Since the election of the Parti Québécois in 1994, the general orientation of this discourse has been re-assessed. Though Quebec's policy with regard to immigration and the management of cultural diversity is still very much in progress, the idea of a Quebec-based citizenship is now firmly rooted in the public discourse. In 1996, a new department, the ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration was created in replacement of the old ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l'Immigration.  This constituted not only a structural change, but also a shift in emphasis as the government clearly indicated its will to deal with citizens first, and not necessarily with representatives of ethnocultural communities. The underlying message was unequivocal : everyone living in Quebec is a Quebecer first and it is as Quebecers first that the state will transact with them, all within a common civic framework applicable to all without distinction. By focussing on the relationship of the state with its citizens, the government downplayed ethnocultural differences and stressed rather the formal equality of every citizen in the eye of the state.

IMMIGRANT AND MINORITY
REPRESENTATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

As the foregoing seems to illustrate, contemporary state practices and discourses about citizenship in Canada, whether expressed by the federal or Quebec government, can be summed up in one key objective : bring immigrants to develop a genuine sense of belonging to the society that welcomes them.  Though some members of immigrant communities are quite prepared to make this objective their own unreservedly, our study reveals infinitely more nuanced and complex, critical positions about the vision of citizenship expounded by the Canadian and Quebec states.

We conducted forty in-depth, one-on-one interviews and held one focus group with Montreal-based, immigrant community activists involved in promoting immigrant integration in Quebec society. Three main sets of considerations guided our approach. We asked them first how they spontaneously identify themselves, inviting them to justify their choice of identity, particularly when they did not identify themselves as Canadian or Québécois only. State discourse, whether federal or Quebec-based, insists on the importance of developing a Canadian or Québécois civic identity before any other : the legitimacy of that identity must be paramount both in the mind of those who declare it as such and in the mind of the interlocutors who will eventually have to recognize it. Our questions about identity were intended, therefore, to appraise both the nature of the imagined identity of our respondents and the impact of governmental discourses upon them.

Secondly, we brought our respondents to discuss their view on Canadian citizenship. We wanted to know what it meant for them (which values, norms, principles, duties and obligations they associate with it) and what was the nature of their personal feelings towards it. We also probed for their view on dual citizenship, the current conditions for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship and issues of belonging. Questions related to social, economic and cultural integration were regularly brought up. Our goal was to determine to what extent the state valorization of Canadian citizenship was shared by the interviewees.

Finally, in light of the importance of the repeated and significant attempts of the Quebec state to offer immigrants an alternative citizenship (through access to independent statehood), we believed it was necessary to question our respondents about this dimension of political life in Quebec. We tried to find out whether the Quebec discourse on citizenship appealed to them and what they thought Quebec citizenship would look like if Quebec were to become a sovereign state.

Identification, Identities and Citizenship

Barely ten percent of our respondents spontaneously identified themselves, without hesitation, as "Canadian" or "Québécois" ; that is to say without recourse to an identity other than that determined by the general civic framework of Canada or Quebec.  Five percent identified themselves only with the national identity or citizenship of their country of origin. The remainder of our sample group (85%) readily hyphenated their identity, using two or more national, civic and even ethnocultural referents to identify themselves. Of this group, close to half (44%) referred to their country or cultural place of origin first before associating it with "Québécois" or "Canadian" (i.e. Italo-Canadian ; Peruvian-Québécois). Twenty nine percent identified themselves as Québécois first (e.g. Québécois of Haitian origin), and twenty four percent as Canadian first (e.g. Canadian of Ghanaian origin).

Two observations stand out : 1) the almost general tendency of our interviewees to adopt dual or multiple civic identities, which in most cases, reflect their reluctance to accept both the Canadian and Quebec state's penchant for a uniform civic identity, and 2) the relative importance of Québécois identity (associated or not with another identity) over Canadian identity. Let us examine these in turn.

The dual or multiple character of identities

It would be premature to conclude on account of the multiple identity options expressed in our sample that the state's attempts at subsuming individual identities into one unitary civic framework and at channelling people's allegiance to the advantage of Canadian citizenship have failed. Several studies in the United States have shown that the persistence of multiple identities after several generations in no way weakens citizens attachment to their adopted country [30]. In our study, in nearly two out of three cases Canada or Quebec was mentioned as the first pole of self-identification, and by and large, many respondents expressed a strong willingness to be part of and to be considered as an inherent member of the host society and its political community.

Be that as it may, for most of the people we interviewed civic identification with Canada or Quebec was not automatic or easy.  Many raised serious concerns over the prevailing governmental notions of citizenship. They particularly pointed out their uneasiness with the idea of citizenship which implies the uncontested primacy of the host country. 

Several factors may explain their reticence. First there is the strength of transnational bonds often maintained through monetary transfers to family members or friends still living in the country of origin, various practices of international cooperation and continued solidarity with the "mother land", or more simply for purely emotional reasons. With several respondents, the pervasiveness of a self-imposed sense of obligation towards countries of origin seems to legitimate the use of hyphenated or multiple civic identities. As one woman of Italian descent put it : "I am a Quebecer of Italian origin. I can't simply say that I am a Quebecer. I am a Quebecer because I was born in Quebec, but the link with Italy remains and I feel I must acknowledge it" [31] [translated from French]. Similarly for this woman of Haitian origin whose roots are indelebile : "I feel I belong to Quebec, the country I have chosen to live. I am a Quebecer ; Canada does not mean much to me. But by birth, skin color, language and culture I am and will always be Haitian"[translated from French]. These are typical declarations which speak volume about the importance of roots and therefore of the emotional bond, symbolic or real, with a pre-immigration culture or past which has little or nothing in common with Canada or Quebec, and which, in the end, inhibits unquestioned endorsement of the Canadian or Quebec citizenship as currently portrayed in the dominant public discourse.

Secondly, the classificatory discourse of the state also plays a role. The tendency of both the federal and Quebec states to impose ethnocultural and sometimes racial categories for administrative purposes often operates in conjunction with deeply rooted social stereotypes about ethnic minorities and imparts individuals with a sense of self marked by difference and social boundaries. As a result, immigrants often feel compelled to adopt a designated identity [32] : "we are constantly reminded of our ethnic origin, of our difference", we were told time and again. As one respondent who insisted on identifying herself as "just Bangladeshi" further explained : "I know I am a Canadian citizen, but even if I say I'm Canadian, the others want to know about my origins, my colour, my language, my religion". In one case the respondent's reluctance to be identified as Canadian or Quebecois was unequivocal and without appeal : "I most likely identify with Guayanese. I don't consider myself a Quebecer, and I have some resentment towards Canada".

The multiculturalist perspective which pervades public discourse has a definite influence in bringing about this kind of attitude : it may boast respect for individual difference and tolerance, but its urgings are more often than not understood as an invitation to celebrate subjective singularity. As a result, essentialist and stereotypical visions of some immigrant communities or minorities tend to dominate the way they are dealt with by the state as well as the way in which they present themselves or vye for power in the public arena. Still, though most or our respondents readily use the classificatory discourse of the state and its attendant ethnoracial lexicon (etnicity, race, cultural communities, visible minorities), they are torn between two positions on this question.

Some, for instrumental and practical reasons, are at ease with this discourse which they see as a necessary evil to guide and inform the state's redistributive action. One man who endorses this position told us :

It is a label, a very crude way of putting a person in a box. It does not disturb me because you need that information. With that information you could do a lot of social programs. It gives you a general indication of what's happening within different communities, but it doesn't give you an accurate representation of the way that community feels and thinks and perceives. As imperfect as it may be, for statistical and research purposes [ethnic or racial categorization] is useful.

This feeling is shared by another respondent who noted :

We are all Canadian, or Quebecer, for the census. And it doesn't matter exactly where you were born or who your parents are. By including the question [of ethnicity in the census] you can get important information about your community. Without it, try to get something out of the governement : they're going to ask you what exactly is your population, what exactly are your numbers in this, what is your status for this, what is your status for that, and if you can't produce that information they don't even look at you. So it's a necessary evil. At times you're damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don't sort of thing.

Others are quite adamant in their rejection of any form of ethnic categorization or classification other than a civic one. In their view, ethnic categorization constitutes a major obstacle to the development of a sense of belonging to the host society as it fosters symbolic exclusion, discrimination and pre-conceived notions about immigrants and minorities that tend to die hard. It creates difference and social boundaries which divide society rather than stimulate social cohesion. As several respondents clearly put it :

That is exactly why it is difficult for most of us to feel genuinely like Quebecers. We are constantly reminded of our origin, our difference. When we are asked "where are you from ?" that implies that we can't possibly be from here in the mind of the interlocutor[translated from French].

I don't like it. I am a citizen like everybody else. I am Black. So ? That's my skin color. We shouldn't be identified with labels. I find that offensive and it only creates more prejudices[translated from French].

It's so silly. It's an insult to me as a human being. All of a sudden someone wants to put you into a little box that they can understand...You think you know me but you don't. You just created a stereotype and in the past stereotypes have been bad.

Opponents of ethnic categorization are found in two broad groups. One comprises recent immigrants whose integration is still quite uneasy, and who have experienced authoritarian political regimes or civil unrest. Canadian citizenship is important to them. They see it as a way out of the distressing life from which they ran away in their country of origin. Being reminded that they are different or that they come from elsewhere is tantamount to questioning the new civic status they acquired in Canada. The other group is made up of long-standing immigrants and second generation youth of immigrant origin who are well integrated into society. For that very reason ethnic categorization, administrative or otherwise, is offensive to them : it implies that regardless of how well they integrated into the host society, they are perceived as others, as not quite part of that society.

Finally, the third factor which accounts for the reticence of the majority of our respondents to claim Canada or Quebec as their one and only anchor of civic identity has to do with their experience of racial discrimination and their perception of their own exclusion, whether real or symbolic. One third of our respondents felt that members from racialized minorities are treated as second-class citizens both by the majority and by other immigrants of European origin. Discrimination in employment and housing is of particular concern to them.  This situation, they argue, creates adversarial stances which, unavoidably, hinders the emergence of a sentiment of belonging to Canada or Quebec. On this score, their understanding of reality is clear :

We're like second-class citizens. When we look for a job, because of our accent, we are immediately rejected.  We are discriminated against on the basis of our language and our nationality[translated from French].

How can you not feel like a second-class person when you consider the way people treat you and the remarks they make if you're not white ? How are you not supposed to feel second class when you get a door slammed in your face because "Hey ! We don't rent houses to whoever" or whatever...[It is all based on] skin color, money access. If you are a minority group and you don't have it, then you are screwed over.

Others are more nuanced or more prudent. They are reluctant to use the notion of second-class citizen, but do admit the existence of racism and xenophobia :

To say that we are second-class citizens is a bit strong. We are perhaps more like "citizens on the fringe". The problem is that there is much ado about integration, while in fact, we are not really integrated [translated from French].

I don't think that we are considered like second-class citizens. We are not in a country where racism is really obvious. It does exist, no doubt ; it is even underhanded at times and in some places. But in this country, people are more xenophobic than racist. The difficulties that some may encounter really depend on the individual, on his efforts and on his ability to face adversity. There is no real obstacles [translated from French].

The respondents who prefer not to invoke the reality of social marginalization or exclusion to explain the weakness of the sentiment of belonging among certains immigrant groups dwell rather on people's personal disposition. Those who feel excluded, they argue, will be unable to develop a strong sense of belonging. Although it is not really expressed so clearly, in the end, the will to belong and the experience of everyday life, they hint, are what determines individuals' civic identification with Canada.

The relative salience of the Québécois identity

As might have been expected, the attitude of several respondents vis-a-vis the Québécois identity is inherently determined by a negative stance on Quebec sovereignty.  Civic allegiance entails allegiance to Canada first and foremost. The political project of Quebec sovereignists conjures up images of sociopolitical instability, exclusion, fear of the unknown among minorities. This comes out clearly in several remarks :

I identify with the country, Canada, first. I am not interested in the politics of the division of the country.

I would say I'm Canadian. I used to say Québécois, but I wouldn't say that now because I've gotten the message that Québécois do no perceive me as Québécois.

[Immigrants] believe that Canada protects against something. They are afraid they might be de-stabilized. They are afraid they might loose the few things they have. They fear they will be mistreated [translated from French].

Be that as it may, as we have already noted a greater number of our respondents more readily used the term Québécois rather than "Canadian" (hyphenated or not) when asked about their civic identity. This is line with what other recent studies have observed : regardless of their cultural or linguistic origin Quebec residents generally tend to consider Quebec as their primary locus of civic affiliation and identity [33]. The Canadian civic identity and the attachment to Canada are less strong, less emphasized in Quebec than in the rest of the country. Some of our respondents were in fact quite adamant about their Québécois identity :

I never say I am Canadian, except for administrative reason, at customs, when it it is necessary for technical reasons. My personal allegiance is Québécois of Indonesian origin [translated from French].

I say that I am Québécois. If people insist I say that I am Morrocan. In Morroco, I fought French ; it symbolized colonialism. Here I will fight English when it colonizes French, destroys the French language and identity [translated from French].

Most people feel that they are Quebecers. But being a Quebecer does not necessarily mean "old stock" Quebecer. Someone of Italian origin is as much a Quebecer as anyone else. If things were understood this way, we would have less problems [translated from French].

These suggest that for certain immigrant groups and ethnic minorities Quebec has become a pole of self-identification which is at least as legitimate as Canada. The increasingly civic, as opposed to ethnic, character of Québécois nationalism in the last fifteen years largely explains this evolution.

This said, many seemed torn in their allegiance. The constant political competition between the Quebec and Canadian states made it difficult for them to choose. As their loyalty as citizens is being solicited from all sides, their sense of belonging oscillates ; it is often stuck in the middle, which prevents them ultimately to opt clearly for one civic identity or another. As the two following quotes illustrate, they are definitely at ease in Quebec, but the more formal, structured environment that Canada appears to offer as a fully-fledged country seems to have a comforting if undefinite appeal :

I say that I am Québécois Canadian of Egyptian origin because I have lived here longer than I did in Egypt. My life is here. I have come to Quebec because life here fits my convictions in cultural and religious terms and also from the point of view of the overall mentality that prevails. Of all the provinces in Canada, Quebec is the one that suits me best culturally, linguistically and from a lifestyle point of view. I feel good here. Still, I have also visited the other provinces and I feel attached to the beautiful country which is Canada [translated from French].

We are Canadian. In which province ? Quebec. I have immigrated to Canada. I want Canada to be united. However, I would not want to live in the English community ; they are cold people. Quebecers have latin blood ; they are warm people. That's why I feel good here. But we have to try harder at becoming a more united family, learn about each other, respect our customs [translated from French].

In a way, this tendency to equivocate over one's civic identity reflects a strategy of prudence, the desire not to offend anyone and "cover all angles". On several occasions our respondents admitted that the way they identify themselves depends on who wants to know, and the circumstances in which they are asked. As one man of Peruvian origin told us :

It is all a matter of context. If, for example, we are discussing Quebec's national question, I will say that I am Québécois. On the other hand, if the discussion has no political implications I will say that I am, more broadly, Peruvian Canadian. Deep down, I am Latino-American, Peruvian, Canadian and then Québécois [translated from French].

Or as another of Chinese descent observed :

My father will tell you that he is a Quebecer, like all Asians. He is basically being polite. But Canada is the first impression made on him when he arrived here and that remains strong [translated from French].

Interestingly, a few respondents refused to define their identity according to the terms seemingly imposed by Quebec's particular political context. A woman, for example, somewhat impatient at our probing on identity issues gruffly declared : I am a human being. That's all !, thus clearly underscoring both how inappropriate and superficial any kind of identity or civic labelling is to her, and how unimportant these questions are in the grand scheme of things. Another type of answer from those who sought to avoid sliding into the trap of Quebec's binary politics is simply to say "I am a Montrealer". This reveals the emergence of an new political identity associated with Montreal's cosmopolitanism and constitutive heterogeneity, held as positive, in contrast to the narrow provincialism associated with the sovereignist vote and the rest of Quebec outside Montreal. One respondent commented :

In my experience, the minorities who are francophone say they feel Québécois but those that are anglophone will feel Canadian first, then Quebecer. It's a linguistic cleavage. But things are changing. They will say Montrealer, they won't say Quebecer, because they feel that Montreal has a distinct character vis a vis the rest of Quebec...It's a way to demarcate themselves from the rest of the province. Since the [1995] referendum, the Montrealer thing has become very strong.

This analysis is corroborated by another respondent who is unequivocal about his Montreal identity :

My first answer is Montrealer. I identify very closely with the city. It's a place that suits me very well. I have lived here for a long time and I know everyone. Montreal is home. When people discuss Quebec, Canada or even North America, I don't really get off on all that [translated from French].

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Issues of belonging and civic self-identification are telling indicators of the sense of attachment immigrants to Canada have toward the country. Clearly, it is much more variegated and diffuse than current state discourses and injunctions about citizenship would have it. This is not to say that immigrants' loyalty to Canada (or Quebec as the case may be) is poor or wanting, but the sense of belonging that emanates from immigrant communities and ethnocultural minorities is at odds with the "pride of place" state officials would like to see them give Canada.  Of course, civic self-identification does not necessarily reveal the view individuals have of the nature of a country's citizenship [34].  For this reason we thought it essential to probe further into the sense immigrants have of Canadian citizenship proper, how they understand it, and what it means to them.

Immigrant views on Canadian citizenship

By and large the perception our respondents have of Canadian citizenship corresponds to the diffuse sentiment of belonging noted above. Noticeable again is the gap between their understanding of Canadian citizenship and what the state expects immigrants and ethnocultural minorities to make of it. We asked our respondents what, in their view, Canadian citizenship entails. We also discussed their position on dual citizenship and the current conditions for acquiring Canadian citizenship.

Canadian citizenship as instrument

The majority of respondents had a positive, but passive, somewhat theoretical, view of Canadian citizenship. Human rights and certain specific values generally associated with Canada in public discourse (tolerance, pacifism, social justice) held an important place in their appreciation of it. "Canada is a country of many cultures, of tolerance. Canadian citizenship implies being accepted in tolerant society where universal, fundamental human rights are respected" is the almost cliché formulation that would often come up spontaneously in conversation. But it is the instrumental qualities of Canadian citizenship, which seemed to elicit the most enthusiasm : the quality of life Canada has to offer, geographical mobility and the ease with which one can travel with a Canadian passport. "When you have Canadian citizenship", many told us, "it is easier to travel abroad. You are accepted all over the world". Barely a quarter of our respondents readily associated Canadian citizenship with a sense of belonging.  Overall the notion of Canadian citizenship appeared to many as rather abstract ; several respondents had a hard time elaborating on the theme, even when probed further. Some even acknowledged that Canadian citizenship is devoid of any particular sense for them, that it does not bring out any particular sentiment. As one person told us : "Belonging to Canada ? This kind of question has never really been a concern of mine".

In fact, only a minority of the respondents (less than 2 in 10) spontaneoulsy subscribed to the active, responsible citizenship which the Canadian state wishes to see emerge. They talked about responsibilities and obligations towards Canada and the general political community ; they felt they have a duty to participate and be a full-fledged partner in the further development of the country.

Dual citizenship

The issue of dual citizenship illustrates further the instrumentalist nature of Canadian citizenship and the gap that separates the state's and immigrant understanding of it.

Dual citizenship in Canada is permitted since 1977.  However, during the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty, this principle was seriously questioned by federalist advocates in their hope to deter Quebecers from voting in favor of sovereignty. They hinted that if Quebec were to become sovereign it would be impossible to hold both a Canadian and a Quebec passport. Quebecers voted against sovereignty and the issue became moot, but, as we saw, the very real threat of Quebec sovereignty prompted the federal government, since 1995, to encourage new Canadians to make Canada their primary, unequivocal site of civic allegiance. Indeed, as the 1994 Report of the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Citizenship and Immigration attests dual citizenship constitutes in the mind of many in power an obstacle to the healthy development of Canadian citizenship.  There is genuine concern in some circles that Canadian citizenship may be nothing more to immigrants than a citizenship of convenience, a useful commodity to have in case of hardship [35].

Though a small minority of our respondents agreed with this general vision of things and affirmed that it is important to make a symbolic break with the country of origin ("One must make one's mind up as to which country one wants to belong", said one of them), the vast majority did not, and considered that dual citizenship does not necessarily hinder individuals from developping an authentic sense of belonging to Canadian society. They believe it is possible to have multiple allegiances and they stressed that, in any case, it is pointless to ask people to renounce the feelings they continue to experience towards their countries of origin :

I have dual citizenship. I would not be able to get rid of one to the benefit of the other. One cannot force someone to feel Canadian. We keep liking our country of origin, so many things link us up to it. Still, we can also feel something special for Canada [translated from French].

[Dual citizenship] is in no way an obstacle to a sentiment of belonging to Canadian society. If you transplant a tree, it will just make new roots somewhere else and keep growing giving perhaps nicer blooms and nicer fruits. It's the same thing [translated from French].

At heart I will always be a citizen of Haiti even if on paper I am no longer one. By becoming a Canadian citizen I lost my rights and privileges in Haiti. But I still think that one can be a good Canadian citizen and a good Haitian citizen [translated from French].

[Dual citizenship] is not a problem inasmuch as both citizenships are not antithetical. Take for example Canadian and Iranian citizenships. In that case the social principles which inform them are different. In Iran, men dominate women and in Canada men and women are equal. As long as the two citizenships are not opposed, there is no problem [translated from French].

Some added that globalization contributes to the development of a multiplicity of allegiances and there is little anybody can do about it :

Our world changes so much. Is expecting people to be attached to only one country realistic ? Our vision of citizenship is a bit obsolete. To force people to become a permanent fixture in one place is to nail us down [translated from French].

In fact, three quarters of our respondents went as far as to think that people who hold dual citizenship should be allowed to retain certain rights in the country of origin (retirement pension, freedom of movement, the right to return to one's country of origin without having to request a visa) [36]. Many felt that dual citizenship is a form of protection in case antagonistic relations between their country of origin and the host country should develop. As one respondent observed :

They stopped short, however, of calling for the maintenance of the right to vote in the country of origin ; opinions were divided on this question.  Still, most of our respondents felt a strong sense of duty towards their country of origin and mentioned the obligation to give support to their extended families still living in the motherland, support in case of natural disaster, or indirect support to economic development via non-governmental organizations.

Finally, it is interesting to note that though nearly half our respondents shared the misgivings of some state officials about Canada being used as a citizenship of convenience, they did not necessarily think that the situation warrants greater restrictions on access to Canadian citizenship.

Acquiring Canadian citizenship

Public debates about citizenship almost always include discussions over the terms and conditions of acquiring Canadian citizenship. Currently, three years of actual presence in Canada as a permanent resident is the minimum requirement for eligibility to citizenship. In recent years, though, many have argued that this was insufficient and that the residency requirement should be lengthened. The government did not accredit this argument, but did make the conditions of naturalization somewhat stricter. The Minister, for example, has more discretionary powers to grant or revoke citizenship and the law is more insistent now on the duties and obligations of citizens, implying that failure to fulfill them properly may jeopardize one's citizenship status.

We asked our respondents whether restricting the acquisition of citizenship was in order at this juncture. Forty percent tended to agree that acquiring Canadian citizenship should be made more difficult. Canadian citizenship is too easy to obtain some argued : if everybody and anybody is accepted, citizenship loses its significance and its symbolic value. A better knowledge of the French language, a longer period of residence, a better selection of international immigrants were generally mentioned as the elements on which tighter controls should be exercised.

The rest of the respondents, a majority, did not believe that the abuses concerning passports and citizenship constituted a sufficient reason to review the criteria for citizenship acquisition. In fact, with many of our respondents we sensed a good deal of unease over the discussions concerning the reform of the Citizenship Law that is underway. One respondent commented :

The young Asian businessmen who have been immigrating to Canada in the past two decades have kept their links abroad and they travel frequently outside Canada. For them territorial belonging to Canada may not be as strong. This does not mean that they do not abide by Canada's mores and social ideals. In this sense, it is hypocritical to expect that those who are aspiring Canadian citizens develop strong territorial belonging to Canada. They are told in a way that they can't reap the fruits of globalization all the while people born here are encouraged to hustle on international markets. The notion of residence is rather vague and unrealistic in the age of globalization [translated from French].

For some, the whole attempt at reformulating the conditions of citizenship acquisition was but an unjustifiable political strategy, influenced by the Reform Party (a national, right-wing, fairly popular, opposition party in Ottawa) ; a self‑protective reaction against some of the problems which immigration poses. One respondent offered :

Anytime the Reform Party makes the least bit of noise then there is a public government announcement : "OK we are going to change the mode of citizenship !". Now all of a sudden there is talk about if you are born in this country, you cannot be a citizen if your parent is not a Canadian citizen... When they do those things, the people they have in mind is visible minority groups, and those are the people the Reform Party hates.

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While the theoretical nature and contents of Canadian citizenship are perceived quite favorably by most, its concrete application is problematic in the eyes of some. In fact, the people to whom we talked objected to being told what kind of emotional involvement is required of them to be considered by the state as full citizens. By and large, immigrants who come to Canada are satisfied with the kind of social accomodation the state and society provide. They resent however that their integration be premised on their according unconditional primacy to a vision of the country and to a particular understanding of belonging which they cannot or will not fully share. Their reticence is not vis-a-vis Canadian citizenship as such, but rather toward the implicit expectations of the state. Their attitude when it comes to Quebec and an eventual Quebec citizenship is, as we will now see, fairly similar.

Immigrant perspectives on Quebec citizenship

Dealing with the policy orientations
of the Quebec State

As we noted in the first part of this paper, since the early 1980s the Quebec state has worked at imparting a feeling of belonging to Québécois culture and society on immigrants and ethnocultural minorities making them share in a "common public culture".

Nearly ninety percent of our respondents thought it possible in principle to build a consensus over the constitutive components of this common public culture as the state sees it (French as the common language in the public arena, democratic values, equality of men and women, pluralism, fundamental individual rights, secularism, social solidarity, the sharing of a common heritage, and the recognition of the historic rights of the anglophone minority of Quebec). However, many expressed reservations as to their application. As one person said : "this is all nice and reassuring, but it is essentially theoretical". Consensus, they often argued, is attainable, but only under certain conditions : little emphasis should be put on the sharing of a collective heritage, for minorities cannot reasonably expected to identify with a history in which they had little or no part ; attitudes and practices on the linguistic front must show a great deal of flexibility ; institutional arrangements must be made to accomodate cultural differences when necessary.

Despite initial optimism as to the potential for consensus, our respondents were generally more prudent about the possibility of building a common framework of civic references and values with French and the Quebec heritage as pivotal elements. To many, this emphasis on language and a so-called common heritage reflects nothing but the will of the French-speaking ? Québécois ? majority to have its culture dominate public life in Quebec. The following are typical reactions :

Common public culture, all you want. Maybe sixty percent of that framework is acceptable. But several elements are problematic, such as equality between men and women, a common heritage. You can teach all you like in our schools, that is not what will generate a warm sense of belonging to the people and history of Quebec [translated from French].

It's incredible, they are still fixated on 1760 (the year of the conquest of the French by the British). In 1837-38 (pivotal year in the history of Quebec : the French Canadian against the British Crown ; they were defeated), my ancestors were not there ; they were trying to come out of slavery (in Haiti). If being Québécois means we have to impregnate ourselves with all that history, we will never be Québécois. Even the two founding nations [of Canada] don't even have the same view of the country's history. Canadian history is glorious for the English Canadians and for French-speaking Quebecers it is repressive and an obstacle to development. There is no common heritage [translated from French].

The will to establish "French as the common language" is interpreted by some members of minorities as a desire to impose the language of the majority, as an attempt to make English disappear :

People equate French language with ethnicity and as long as people equate the French with ethnicity then you will never get anywhere. French language has to be equated with the language of our society, of a civic society... It is seen as one ethnic group imposing their language on me. Who are they to force me to speak their language ? Nobody can force me to do anything. I am an individual, I am free. I have choice, so there is a clash.

A majority of respondents shared, in principle at least, the government's discourse on citizenship. That was especially true of immigrants who come from French-speaking countries or who are immersed in a francophone cultural environment. Meanwhile, for a minority of respondents, all of them from the anglophone community, the new emphasis by the Quebec government on civic relations risks being done at the expense of the recognition of and of the taking into account of the needs of the minorities, especially in a context of budgetary problems.

Clearly, the language issue and Quebec's national question were definite sore points with at least half of our respondents who felt that these largely explained some of the tensions between minorities and the French-speaking majority. As long as they will remain unresolved, most believed that strong feelings of belonging to Quebec society will be hard to come by. This said, we noted, as did several respondents, that feelings of belonging vary significantly according to specific groups (French-speaking versus English-speaking minorities), people's mastery of French, the length of residence in Quebec and the degree of incorporation of Quebec's social and cultural parameters.

Citizenship and political sovereignty

If Quebec ever became independent, what kind of citizenship will be put in place ?  This question obviously refers to an hypothetical situation, but we felt that answers to it would also give us a sense of the way immigrants and minorities view Quebec's current aspirations to develop a citizenship of its own as well as an idea of the kind of society they anticipate an independent Quebec would be for them.

In a sovereign Quebec, who will a Quebec citizen be ?  Interestingly, our respondents views on this were very close to the official discourse of the current government. They seemed to espouse the civic and territorial notions the government has been brandying about for the past few years : anyone who is a Canadian citizen residing on the Quebec territory at the time of independence will automatically be considered a Quebec citizen [37]. Hence, for our respondents, to be a Quebec citizen is to pay one's taxes, to vote on its laws and to reside on the territory of Quebec. Some added the notion of participation.

To pay one's taxes, and be a resident for three of five years.  That's all [translated from French].

It's a question of territory. People who currently live here should be recognized as full fledged citizens of the new state, regardless of their political opinion or whether or not they are "old stock" Quebecers [translated from French].

There should be nothing more than what is presently. Quebecers are all those who live in Quebec at the time of independence [translated from French].

"When in Rome..." as goes the old saying. Similarly should be considered a Quebecer anyone who loves Quebec and who has its betterment at heart [translated from French]. 

What principles or values should form the basis of Quebec citizenship ? In general, the persons interviewed imagined Quebec citizenship as a close copy of Canadian citizenship adapted to Quebec. They invoked already existing principles : a democratic Quebec, in which the Charter of Human Rights protects freedoms, the prohibition of discrimination, and an openness to pluralism. As one respondent insisted : "A sovereign Quebec should continue to abide by the same fundamental principles. The only things that should change are of an administrative nature"[translated from French].

Some hoped that Quebec would review the Canadian Constitutions of 1867 or of 1982. They proposed the recognition of three "founding peoples" (francophones, anglophones, natives) ("Quebec should do all the things that Canada did not do"), a republican form of government ("holding on to this Queen thing, that is a very ethnic thing"), the secularization of institutions, the official recognition of the legitimacy of having more than one allegiance, a more concrete application of openness to difference, and the possibility of rethinking heritage by taking into account the diversity which makes up the Québécois people. Others insisted on specific values, such as social‑democracy and social justice.

I sincerely hope that it will be a democratic society, fair and equitable, which will protect the weakest and most vulnerable among us, a participatory society, somehwat decentralized, where citizens can be party to the decision-making process [translated from French].

Interestingly, nearly half of the respondents proposed modifications to the conditions of acquisition of Quebec citizenship in the event of sovereignty. The major proposal concerned the French language : in a sovereign Quebec the knowledge of French should become an essential condition in the acquisition of citizenship. This was mentionned as often by people from the anglophone community as it was by those from the francophone milieu.

The other proposed modifications suggested stricter conditions for the acquisition of Quebec citizenship such as lengthening the residency requirement to five years, more selective immigration, cracking down on abuses of the health care system by immigrants  criteria restrict access to it because actual immigration is not selective enough. One respondent went so far as to suggest refusing access to those who hold fundamentalist religious views or who would be deemed unwilling to subscribe to Quebec's basic sociocultural values. Finally, a few respondents hoped that one would be offered a choice between Quebec and Canadian citizenships or be allowed to hold on to two or three nationalities. This was invoked mostly in reaction to the possible loss of Canadian citizenship in the context of a sovereign Quebec.

In a way we were surprised to see how willingly our respondents entertained the hypothetical idea of a sovereign Quebec. By and large, when faced with the possibility of Quebec citizenship, their attitude was roughly the same as with Canadian citizenship : it is not the constitutive principles or the nature of citizenship that is at play, but rather the fact that the state is seen as engineering and imposing a particular vision which entails expectations of sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors that many feel are at odds with their own understanding of the society in which they have chosen to live.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The main goal of this paper was to take stock of the reaction of immigrants and ethnocultural minorities who live in Quebec to the state discourses on citizenship, which have occupied a significant place in the Canadian public debates of the past decade. Our interviews with people directly concerned by these discourses show that there exists a definite gap between how the state envisions immigrant integration, particularly when it comes to endorsing unreservedly Canada's (or Quebec's) core values, and the terms according to which immigrants and members of ethnocultural minorities understand their incorporation into Canadian and Quebec society. While nothing points to fundamental and irreconcilable differences, it is clear that immigrants and members of ethnocultural minorities are not necessarily prepared to abide blindly by state injunctions when it comes to issues of belonging and the sociopolitical ideals which the state holds dear. Many among the people with whom we talked want nothing more than to feel as integral part of Canadian and Quebec society, but on terms that they would contribute to develop, not according to pre-established state notions of citizenship.

In this paper we were primarily concerned with mapping out and illustrating the shape and extent of the discursive divide between immigrants and the state in Canada. Another paper would be needed for a fuller account of the reasons of this divide. It is possible, however, to offer in broad outlines the factors that seem to contribute most to the reticence we perceived in most of our interviews.

State categorization of race and ethnicity

We noted the fact above but it bears repeating here, the institutionalization of essentialist categories to identify members of immigrant groups and ethnocultural minorities often seems to work to mitigate any enthusiasm they might have for Canadian (or Quebec) citizenship. The Canadian government's notion of "visible minorities" and Quebec's "cultural communities" may have their bureaucratic and statistical usefulness ; they may even seem unavoidable in any politics of resistance against racism and discrimination. The fact is, they are not neutral, innocent notions. First, they create the illusory impression that minority groups are homogeneous ; they essentialize, even freeze in a way their status and identity in the social imagination [38]. But more significant, it creates a boundary between "old stock" Canadians and "ethnics". In this and other fieldwork a large proportion of the people interviewed have objected to the utilization of ethno-racial terminology to identify them. They note its exclusionary effect and insist it produces a differentialist ideology. When do we become Canadian ? they would ask. When do we cease to be mere immigrants ? To what extent will this state categorization affect the identity and the social mobility of the new generations born in Canada ? Such questions express a genuine concern as immigrants and ethnocultural minorities seem faced with unabashed, though sometimes symbolic, marginalization and perpetual "immigrization" [39]. As a result, the emergence of a considerable amount of adversarial attitude toward a sentiment of belonging to Canada or Quebec, within certain groups is inevitable.

Economic exclusion, racial discrimination,
and the underrepresentation of racialized minorities
in the public sphere

Actual discrimination, economic exclusion and poor public representation deter racialized minorities from buying into state discourse. In light of the present study and of our previous fieldworks, it appears ever clearer to us that the major obstacle to the development of a citizenship which conforms to the ideals of of the Canadian and/or Québécois state - that is to say a citizenship which implies a feeling of belonging to the nation  is a result, first and foremost, of the differential modes of incorporation (segmented assimilation) and of systematic discrimination of which many Canadians belonging to racialized groups, in particular, are victims.

As we saw, many of our respondents clearly stressed that racialized minorities are second class citizens in Canadian and Quebec society. Others did not want to be so categorical, but they nevertheless recognized that the racialized minorities often face serious situations of socio-economic and symbolic exclusion. The feeling of marginalization was therefore strongly shared by many in our sample, even if the assessment by the respondents as to the intensity of the problem varied.

The fact is, unemployment among racialized minorities is the highest. In Quebec, while they represent six percent of the Quebec population and twelve percent of the Montreal area population (1996 census) the unemployment rate of racialized minorities reaches 22 per cent. In contrast, the unemployment rate of the immigrant population is around 16 per cent and the overall rate is at 11 percent. Racialized minorities also experience poverty on a larger scale as their income is 15 percent lower than that of the average Canadian personal income. In spite of affirmative action programs and commitment to increase recruitment of racialized minorities in public services, goals have not been met. The proportion of minorities in the Quebec public civil service hovers between two and four percent ; it is at three percent in federal institutions. Symbolic racism comes also from European minorities against racialized minorites. For example, in our interviews comments on devalued citizenship and abuses generally came from citizens of European background against Blacks, Arabs, etc.

Resistance to traditional ideas of citizenship
and transnational orientations

The idea of a unique identity, of rights and duties which are exclusively attached to Canadian citizenship do not take account of the transnational aspects linked with citizenship in everyday life. In several cases, the new belonging, the new identity, and the new allegiance demanded of them cannot be a substitute for their initial identity, the belonging, and the allegiance they still feel toward their country of origin.  This is especially true in the emerging conjuncture prompted by the imperatives of international market exchanges as immigrants appear more as useful partners for the international capacity of the host country than as eventual compatriots.

The variability of transnational practices and identities may come from the economic and political situation in the country of origin. They may also come from immigration and integration policies of the host country, the degree of openness of civil society, the job market structure, and the community structuration. Indeed, the transnational practices and identities of immigrants and their descendants can be the expression of defensive positions against a subaltern status in the host society, and against the normative integration ideologies of the host society, the promises of which are not kept. At the same time, these practices find support in national reconstruction (and sometimes democratization) projects and ideologies of return (idéologies du retour). They are fuelled by the insecurity and de-qualifying of professionals, cadres, and university graduates whenever social mobility is no longer assured.

And, lastly, among the factors accounting for the transnational practices of migrants is the self-directed work by intellectuals of immigrant origin : defence and illustration of a migrant identity ; critical reconsiderations of racial categorizations ; demands on behalf of and participation in the invention of a culture in flux ; redefinition and re-symbolization of political belonging and citizenship ; mobilization with a view to democratizing the countries of origin [40].

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Other factors should also be cited to explain the apparent distance of immigrants from current state models of citizenship. They basically refer to the social and political particularities of the the Quebec context.

The hegemonic influence of the federal policy
of multiculturalism

Quebec policies with regard to the integration of immigrants and members of ethnocultural communities are seen as suspect in many quarters ; they are ignored and even rejected. For some leaders of those communities, integration to a common public culture was and is still interpreted as one of the phases of a disguised assimilationist policy. The first phase was the 1977 Language Act which made French the official language of Quebec, and the next phase is currently underway as the latest governmental orientations insist on developing a full-fledged Quebec citizenship.  The latter is often perceived as an attempt to downplay Quebec's cultural diversity and defuse aspirations of Canadian national unity.

Detractors of the Quebec policy of immigrant and minority integration oppose it to the federal government policy of multiculturalism — which is readily associated at least at the official level — with tolerance, bilingualism, pluralism and respect of human rights. On this front then the federal government is in a favorable position to exercise real power and influence, through its capacity to grant financial aid to ethnic organizations or institutions, through the political alliances struck with ethnic lobbies supporting federalism, and through the publicity campaigns conducted in both languages on national unity. In fact, the federal government has sole responsability for services relating to citizenship. There is no restriction on its actions pertaining to the promotion of multiculturalism. As a result, the federal government's view of citizenship is more likely to gain credence. In contrast, as the federal multiculturalism policy contributes to the ethnicization of French-speaking Quebecers [41], the legitimacy of their claim for a distinct, but universal and inclusive Quebec citizenship is not very strong among immigrants and members of ethnocultural minorities. The Quebec state seems to stand out as the state of the Francophone majority and French-speaking Quebecers as one ethnocultural group among others, a status which in the mind of immigrants and members of ethnocultural minorities is far from sufficient to impose a Quebec-based citizenship.

The status of French as the common public language
of Quebec

The federal policy of multiculturalism has a corollary : a policy of bilingualism in federal institutions. Canada's bilingual status is often seen as a great gesture of social accomodation. Hence in the mind of many, there should be no reason for Quebec to "impose" French as the official language when they live in a supposedly bilingual country. The fact is, the attraction of French among certain immigrants and members of ethnocultural minorities remains minimal. It was believed a decade or so ago that the officialization of French as the main language of public transactions in Quebec was a compromise that would ensure linguistic peace and create new relations of power.  In reality, immigrants and members of ethnocultural minorities are divided in their allegiance to either French or English.  Although French has made considerable progress as the main language of public transaction among immigrants, English continues to be a pivotal language of public and private communication in Quebec and a powerful instrument of socialization for immigrants even among immigrants of French speaking origin. The linguistic split within the different communities of immigrants in Quebec influences their position relative to the political status of Quebec, and by extension to any claim to an independent citizenship Quebec may make for itself.

Attitudes towards Quebec nationalism and sovereignty

Historically, the resistance of the immigrant, ethnic and racialized population to the idea of a sovereign Quebec has been significant.  There are however active sovereignist segments among immigrant communities. It is not uncommon, for example, to find among first wave (1960-1970) Haitian immigrants strong supporters and militant of the sovereignist Parti Québécois. Similarly, though no definite and reliable statistics are yet available, significant segments of Latin American immigrants are known to be rather sympathetic to the idea of Quebec sovereignty. Immigrants who endorsed the sovereignist project invoke solidarity with the majority of Quebecers of French-Canadian background, recognition of the national character of Quebec, economic or political rationality of the project, need for structural changes, or analogy of struggles for national or anti-imperialist liberation in countries of origin, etc.

Rejection of Quebec sovereignty is connected to other elements : concerns over the economic consequences, attachment to Canada which is seen as the true host society, worries that social upheaval will follow, distrust of the Quebec state, seen as tentacular and intrusive, the low esteem in which nationalistic movements are held, and so on. Many also argue that sovereignist claims are not founded, given the mildness of national oppression, compared to what has happened or is going on in countries where some immigrants originate, or that nationalism is obsolete and transnational ties and identities are more important to them. Fairly successful anti-Quebec media campaign in national, local as well as ethnic media at the time of the 1995 referendum (accusations of racism and ethnic cleansing against the Quebec government and sovereignists), combined with a rather vocal partitionist movement have also played an important role in distancing immigrants and members of ethnocultural minorities from the Quebec state and its project of a distinct Quebec citizenship. Finally, the unfortunate words of Jacques Parizeau, (Premier and leader of the sovereignist forces at the time of the 1995 referendum), who blamed moneyed forces and the "ethnic vote" on learning that he had been defeated on the night of the referendum, left a scar which many feel has not healed yet. Parizeau's declaration, though denounced later by other sovereignists leaders, fueled resentment among immigrant and ethnocultural minorities and in many ways exacerbated their antisovereignist sentiments as they feel like outsiders and excluded from the sovereignist project and, by extension, from Quebec society.

*
*     *

The cultural and national diversity which today characterizes Canada and Quebec raises complex and difficult challenges. Caught between the desire not to alienate the immigrant segment of the population and the will not to dilute the socio-institutional heritage which predates recent immigration and gives society its current outlook, the Canadian and Quebec governments have turned to strategies which at times border on social engineering. Using a discourse that appears to be motivated by openness, tolerance and generosity, the hope is to convince immigrants and the ethnic minorities to adhere unreservedly to the parameters which currently define Canadian (or Quebec) society and institutions. This approach is often dubious, irritates many of the groups and individuals it addresses and provokes a fair amount of ill-will amongst them. It is as if the state was trying too hard, leaving people with the impression that it offers in the end nothing more than a discourse unsupported by concrete actions.

APPENDIX:
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Our project is based upon data gathered during fieldwork done during the fall of 1996 and the winter of 1997. We conducted forty (40) in-depth interviews with community activists who come from diverse ethnic or racialized minorities in the region of Montreal. These respondents were chosen on the basis of their involvement in diverse community organisations, public institutions or political parties. 

Our study was conducted in two distinct Montréal districts : francophone dominated neighborhoods such as Rivière-des-Prairies and Montréal-Nord in the North-East of Montréal, and predominantly anglophone neighborhoods like Notre-Dame-de-Grâce and Côte-des-Neiges, in the West of Montréal. These neighborhoods are veritable social microcosms where important challenges associated with the management of diversity are played out.

Among the criteria of the chosen urban environments, we should note the importance of the populations associated with the minority groups and the cultural heterogeneity which flows from them, and the relative linguistic polarisation of these areas. For example, 75% of the population of Rivière‑des‑Prairies declared itself to be mother tongue French in 1991, 4.79% were mother tongue English and 20.4% spoke non‑official languages. In the case of Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, 31.6% declared themselves to be mother tongue French, 37.4% were mother tongue English and 30.8% spoke non‑official languages. In both areas the diversity of the minority groups is considerable. Côte‑des‑Neiges in particular is considered to be the most multi‑ethnic neighborhood in Canada. Finally, its associations with ethnic or racialized identities are numerous.

Our respondents were selected from three sectors of community activities in Montreal : the health and social services network in different neighborhoods (the Centres locaux de services communautaires where studies had shown a strong presence of ethnic minorities, from the users up to the level of the administrative Councils) ; we also chose multisectoral groupings like the Tables de concertation de quartier (Neighborhood Planning Boards) and the Conseils communautaires (Community Councils) where the representatives of community groups and public institutions (the Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration, School Boards, Police Services, Municipalities, etc.), meet and discuss community issues ; finally, we looked for respondents who were active in politics at the municipal and provincial levels

Our respondents were all engaged citizens and active members in their community (e.g. a member of the Administrative Council of a CLSC, an associated member on the Neighborhood Planning Board, an influential member of a political party).

Our sample comprised an equal number of men and women, and the average age was 39.9. Twenty-four people had university degrees. Five respondents were born in Canada, from Haitian, Barbadian, Honduran, Italian and French origins. Ten were came from North Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, Morroco, Algeria and Lebanon), seven came from the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Haiti, St-Vincent and Guyana), six from Latin America (Chili, Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Argentina). Finally, four people came from Asia (Indonesia, Hong Kong, Vietnam et Laos), four from Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Cameroun and Rwanda) and four from Europe (Britain, Belgium, Italy and the USSR).

Five important religious groups are represented : Catholics, Christians, Jews, Muslims and Buddhists ; others claimed not to practice any religion. The vast majority of respondents - 36 out of 40 - have Canadian citizenship ; while a third of the respondents have two to three citizenships.

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